BY HASSAN HASSAN | SEPTEMBER 18, 2013
FOREIGN POLICY

Earlier this month, clashes erupted between the al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra and FSA-affiliated groups. When the gunfire stopped, the moderates were able to negotiate a ceasefire deal that represented a body blow to Jabhat al-Nusra’s influence in the area: The jihadist group agreed to ask foreign jihadists in its ranks to leave the city, “as there is no fighting in Abu Kamal and so there is no need for wearing masks or even carrying arms.” The groups also agreed that security in the city must be handled exclusively by the “security brigade,” and other FSA-affiliated rebel groups. Finally, it prohibited Jabhat al-Nusra from establishing checkpoints in the city, and stipulated that houses can only be raided through a court order and by FSA brigades.

Remarkably, Jabhat al-Nusra issued a two-page apology to the people of Abu Kamal, in which it blamed the FSA for forcing the war on the jihadist organization. It said that it had pulled its fighters from the frontlines to defend itself against “groups that seek to establish a secular state.” Jabhat al-Nusra asserted in the apology that it could easily defeat the FSA — but the fact that it tried to reach out to the public, rather than engage in further confrontation, suggests that it’s mindful of growing public opposition.

Abu Kamal is predominantly tribal and more conservative than most areas in Syria, but this development proves that it’s not a natural breeding ground for jihadist groups. Extremists have tried repeatedly to establish a foothold there — when the regime’s forces left the region, jihadists presented themselves as a force that could get things done. They distributed badly-needed cooking gas, fuel, and foodstuffs to the local population. Meanwhile, the FSA groups stumbled, neglecting the population and focusing on their own financial gain. Jihadists, however, are their own worst enemies — as time passed, the local population grew restless of their medieval style of rule.

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