By Zalmay Khalilzad, Wednesday, August 8, WASHINGTON POST

Zalmay Khalilzad was the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations from 2007 to 2009 during the George W. Bush administration.

The United States has a window to facilitate an orderly transition in Syria without deploying military force. But the window is narrowing — and the Obama administration will need to adjust its political strategy to succeed.

Diplomatically, the administration has focused on engaging the U.N. Security Council and the Friends of Syria, a French-created group of 88 participating states, seven international organizations and one observer (the Vatican). But the Security Council remains in stalemate by Russian and Chinese vetoes, and the Friends of Syria is too unwieldy to reach agreement on operational measures that would change conditions on the ground.

Militarily, the administration’s decision to provide only non-lethal assistance to the Syrian opposition is prolonging unfavorable trends on the battlefield. While opposition gains have precluded the possibility of President Bashar al-Assad shooting his way to victory, the opposition is too weak to bring the conflict to an end. Beyond exacerbating the human toll, a long civil war increases the likelihood that state institutions will fragment, that weapons of mass destruction will be used or fall into the wrong hands, that extremists — such as fundamentalist Salafi Islamists and al-Qaeda — will make headway, and that ethnic and sectarian bloodletting will go on after the Assad regime falls.

To facilitate an orderly transition without deploying force, the United States must do five things:

First, galvanize a “coalition of the relevant”: a select group of like-minded countries that have significant leverage and influence in Syria. While continuing to engage the United Nations, the Friends of Syria and NATO, Washington should focus on integrating efforts with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar and other Gulf states, as well as Britain and France.

Second, President Obama should appoint a special envoy to work with the coalition in organizing the Syrian opposition into a broad-based front that provides a vehicle for a stable transition, attracts support from Syrians fearful of regime change, and co-opts elements of the Assad regime. Chaos and an Iraq-style bloodbath — in which Syria’s Alawite minority, embittered at the loss of their privileged position, turns to insurgency while Sunnis, empowered after decades of repression, seek revenge — are possible.

Regional powers have been unable to unify the opposition or identify credible leaders who enjoy broad national support. The Syrian National Council is disproportionately composed of exiles and members of the Muslim Brotherhood whose following among Syrians and stated commitments to an inclusive Syria are untested. The Free Syrian Army is more in tune with realities on the ground, but it remains unclear how unified that group is and whether the paramilitary force can govern responsibly once the fighting ends. The Kurds’ loyalty to the Syrian state is fraying. And the Alawite-dominated military is tainted by long-standing loyalties to the Assad dynasty.

read more here: