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The US-Iran standoff over the dual blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has become the fulcrum of a global crisis unlike anything seen in modern times — at least not since the COVID-19 pandemic. This crisis is human-made, triggered by the start of joint American-Israeli military strikes on Iran in late February. What was intended to be a swift campaign with vague strategic objectives has since hardened into geopolitical gridlock, with cascading consequences for regional and global economies.
The ceasefire that President Donald Trump announced on April 7 has largely held. But Washington’s original aim — forcing Iran into submission over its nuclear program — has given way to a more urgent objective: reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Iran blocked the strait in a move to upset the balance of power stacked against it and raise the stakes both regionally and globally. Its asymmetric response prompted Trump to impose his own naval blockade of the same waterway, creating a stranglehold that neither side has yet found the political will to release.
The two sides have exchanged proposals and counterproposals since the ceasefire took effect. Trump has rejected all Iranian overtures, dismissing them as unacceptable. While the full details remain undisclosed, it is understood that Tehran is using the Strait of Hormuz card as a bargaining chip for a comprehensive settlement — one that ends the war, reopens the strait, resolves the nuclear file, including enrichment rights, determines the fate of existing highly enriched stockpiles, allows international inspections, provides reparations, lifts sanctions, and unfreezes foreign assets.
It is understood that Tehran is using the Strait of Hormuz card as a bargaining chip for a comprehensive settlement
Osama Al-Sharif
Washington’s conditions, by contrast, remain as maximalist as they were on the eve of the war: the denial of Iran’s enrichment rights, dismantlement of nuclear facilities, surrender of approximately 450 kg of highly enriched uranium, limitations on Iran’s ballistic missile program, and the severing of ties with regional proxies. These are not American conditions alone — they are, in substance, Benjamin Netanyahu’s conditions. The Israeli prime minister is the only foreign leader who has been treated as a full and equal partner in this war. And it is here that Washington is committing a grave strategic error.
America’s Gulf allies were neither consulted nor informed before the war on Iran was launched. Yet they are the ones who have absorbed multibillion-dollar losses to their energy and civilian infrastructure. Most have been unable to export oil and gas since hostilities began. The Trump administration has shown little regard for this damage, hastily dismissing the Iranian overtures.
Washington would do well to consult its Gulf partners before deciding its next move. On Sunday, Trump announced an operation to “guide” stranded tankers through the Strait of Hormuz — a plan that analysts in Washington quickly dismissed as both dangerous and futile. Within hours of the so-called operation commencing, multiple vessels in and around the strait were reported hit, damaged or forced to turn back. According to The New York Times, Trump’s “Project Freedom” has left shipping firms bewildered about what the initiative entails and how it is supposed to work.
Time is running out. Both sides must accept that only a political settlement — one acceptable to both parties and mindful of the broader Gulf region’s interests — can break the current deadlock. Short of a return to full-scale military confrontation, the two sides must come to terms with a simple reality: only a formula in which both sides can claim a measure of victory will end this crisis.
Time is running out. Both sides must accept that only a political settlement can break the current deadlock
Osama Al-Sharif
Iran’s latest 14-point proposal, delivered through Pakistan and made public by Al Jazeera on Sunday, is instructive in this regard. It takes a far more comprehensive approach than previous overtures, essentially trading an exclusive nuclear deal for a broader regional security bundle. On the nuclear file, it replicates the core parameters of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — capping enrichment at 3.67 percent and addressing stockpile levels — but explicitly rules out dismantling any nuclear infrastructure or destroying any facility. Iran is prepared to freeze activity and transfer or dilute enriched material, but the physical capability remains entirely intact.
There are nuanced differences from 2015 on long-term oversight arrangements, though these may well be issues left for negotiators to resolve in a final phase. The new proposal also demands the lifting of the US naval blockade and the release of frozen assets as part of a phased, timetabled process — going considerably further than the JCPOA, under which nonnuclear sanctions remained in force.
One structural complication is worth noting: unlike the JCPOA, which was negotiated by a multilateral front — the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany — and endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, any new agreement would be bilateral, between Washington and Tehran alone. How it would be enforced without broader international backing remains unclear, though both sides could subsequently seek UN endorsement.
What Iran’s proposal ultimately signals is a geopolitical deal with nuclear provisions attached. Tehran is offering roughly the same terms on the nuclear file as it agreed to in 2015, with certain omissions, while demanding considerably more in return: regional military withdrawal, ceasefire guarantees, commitments on proxies, and reparations.
Most significant for the region is the proposal’s third phase, which envisages Iran entering a strategic dialogue with Arab and regional states to build a pan-Gulf security architecture — one that guarantees the sovereign rights and security of all countries sharing the Arabian Gulf basin. This element should not be left to US-Iran bilateral bargaining. And it certainly should not be subject to Israeli veto or influence. A framework that safeguards freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and enshrines nonaggression among littoral states is in the interest of every country bordering the Gulf.
Trump has said he remains unsatisfied with Iran’s latest proposal, while allowing that Washington is engaged in “very positive discussions” with Tehran. Whether that reflects Iran’s strengthened leverage or a weakened hand depends entirely on who is doing the reading — in Washington and in Tel Aviv.
- Osama Al-Sharif is a journalist and political commentator based in Amman. X: @plato010
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News’ point of view
source https://www.arabnews.com/node/2642412
Categories: Arab World, Iran, United States, USA, War, War crimes