When the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) lost control of Anbar’s provincial capital Ramadi just under a year after their infamous loss of Mosul to the marauding Islamic State (Daesh) group late last May it became clear that Daesh wouldn’t be defeated anytime soon and that the liberation of Iraq’s second-city Mosul would be postponed. In a desperate bid to rectify this state-of-affairs we are witnessing two offensives gradually materialize. One, by the ISF and some affiliated paramilitary elements supported by United States air strikes, to retake Ramadi and another, by the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU’s) umbrella fighting force, to retake Fallujah.

For months there has been expressed concerns among many observers that having Shia militias enter Iraq’s Sunni-majority Anbar province could be potentially fatal. Former U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, for example, even went so far as tostate that,

“I CANNOT IMAGINE ANYTHING MORE CAREFULLY CALCULATED TO PERMANENTLY SPLIT THIS COUNTRY APART, THE COUNTRY OF IRAQ APART, THAN A SHIA-LED MILITARY EFFORT INTO A COMPLETELY SUNNI AREA.”

However, as Iraq-analyst Hayder Al-Khoei quite rightfully pointed out after Ramadi’s fall, the PMU’s are not exclusively Shi’ite militiamen. There is a Christian militia in there as well as Sunni tribesmen who wish to rid their home province of Daesh. It would now be a stretch to depict them as an exclusively Shi’ite sectarian force who are going into Anbar to subjugate the ordinary local Sunnis. Many ordinary Sunnis who have fled and lost everything as a result of Daesh’s takeover of their homeland have found sanctuary in Iraq’s Shia-majority heartland, even in the most sacred of Shia shrines. The kind Daesh wish they could blow-up like their Al-Qaeda predecessors did to Al-Askari Mosque back in 2006.

The nature of the two offensives we are seeing the transpiration of are very informative. In Fallujah we see a predominantly PMU effort underway aimed at dislodging Daesh. And many figures within the PMU’s leadership, especially those with links to Iran, do not seek nor welcome American assistance. As was the case in Tikrit earlier this year many of these forces want to show the rest of Iraq and the world that, in their view, American assistance is not necessary and that they can beat Daesh themselves without any outside assistance. And in Fallujah it appears that is what they are earnestly trying to do.

The Americans, wary of the Iranian connections and support to Shia militias within the PMU’s, have long hoped that the ISF and army could get its act together and kick Daesh out of Iraq without having to rely too heavily on the support of the Shia militias. It appears they want to try and help the ISF save face by supporting their efforts (which are being undertaken in tandem with some supporting Shia militiamen and Sunni tribesmen) to force Daesh out of Ramadi by giving them close air support there. However after their initial sorties against visible Daesh’s positions there they haven’t been launching as many due to lack of targets and aware that more indiscriminate strikes is just going to kill civilians. Despite this air support and the larger attacking force of Iraqis (there are about 10,000 Iraqi ground forces backed by U.S. air power against what by many reports is likely less than 1,000 Daesh fighters) this offensive has yet to force entrenched Daesh members from the city.

There are also worrying signs in Fallujah that Daesh has dug in so deep (they have been occupying Fallujah for over 18-months now!) that they have scrupulously prepared themselves for this possibility. Doubtlessly the city has been heavily laden with explosive booby-traps to ensnare, wound and kill the PMU’s and many of Fallujah’s remaining civilians are being, and will be, used by Daesh as human shields. Bloody clashes and civilian casualties (Daesh’s usage of human shields is good for their sinister propaganda purposes since they can try to stoke sectarian tensions by claiming civilian Sunnis forced into the crossfire by them and killed were purposely murdered by the Shia, perish the thought) are unfortunately going to be inevitable. Some in the Iraqi government have expressed fears that Daesh may even commit widespread massacres of local populations before being forcibly removed from that province.

It was acknowledged that this would be a protracted long-term effort. When Ramadi fell last May Hadi al-Amiri, Iraq’s Minister for Transport and the leader of the Hashd al-Shaabi Shia paramilitary, stated that an immediate full-frontal counter-assault to retake Ramadi and/or Fallujah would be a “laughable” strategy to undertake. Instead, he insisted, cutting off Daesh’s supply lines more gradually and encircling them first would be a much better policy. One which will require substantial numbers of ground forces and logistics. Unfortunately it appears from the vantage point of the present that he is correct in his assessment. Iraq and its people have a long fight ahead of them to rid their country of Daesh and the two offensives underway in Anbar have gotten off to a slow start. But at least they have started. One hopes these offensive continues unabated and will prove to be the beginning of the end of Daesh.