It is a self fulfilling prophecy that an issue with tribal, ethnic, religious and militant overtones when grossly mismanaged  for over a decade will inevitably turn into a veritable Gordian knot. So it is with the problem of the Pakistani Taliban (the term Pakistani Taliban or the Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan – TTP is used advisedly with a view to establish a stark distinction from Afghan Taliban). In the mind of most Pakistanis, perception of the problem varies violently between extremes. To some, Pakistani Taliban are consummate evil, stone age barbarians only deserving ignominious extermination. To others,  they are tragic figures justifiably resisting brutal state oppression. Consequently, the perpetrated solutions range spectrally from uncompromising military action to unconditional appeasement and compromise. The truth, as is always the case, is a little less simplistic than these rhetorical extremes. The solutions, obviously, need to be a little more nuanced than either extermination or capitulation.

Many people preface their support for the Pakistani Taliban by deploying an artificial argument: that the movement started after the FATA was invaded by the Pakistan Army in 2002 and subsequent airstrikes and UAV based missile firings by the USAF; that once the Army is withdrawn and the drones stopped, the problem would be resolved. There are two logical fallacies with this approach that need to be considered. The first is the issue of primary cause and where to start the clock. The resistance did not start because the army went in. Rather, the army went in because all was not well in the FATA. The military was not launched in a vacuum. Prevailing circumstances forced the hand of the state to resort to use of military force – this was a reaction and not the primary action tipping the dominoes. The second logical fallacy is to focus on the alleged inciting event in isolation and argue that removal of that irritation a decade later shall resolve the situation. This implies that the zeitgeist today will revert back to the zeitgeist in 2002 only if the army were to withdraw or the drone strikes were to cease. Clearly, this viewpoint has more to do with wishful thinking than grounding in any kernel of realism.

Those opposed to the Pakistan Taliban lump everyone together as a monolithic block of grossly anti-federal savages. As long as one focuses only on the brutality and savagery, it is easy to collectively dehumanize the enemy and sanction the most severe collective punishment. This is simplistic and counterproductive. It is essential to dissect the very complicated relationship between the Pakistani Taliban elements and the local population at large directly exposed to their brutal tactics. That the entire population is not homogeneously anti-state and of course cannot be liquidated should be abundantly clear. No “final solution” for this problem is practical, needed or just.

It is also quite obvious that with a prolonged military engagement this ulcer may become chronic but will not be cured. There is no standing army called Pakistani Taliban. It is a loose conglomerate of some sixteen diverse criminal, sectarian, foreign and extremist groups on the warpath, now impacting the local population.  These are tribesman facing economic, social and indeed existential consequences as a result of this insurgency. A perfect storm of traditional and habitual obstinacy, illiteracy, misguided religious zeal and passion, economic depravity and frustration makes this tick. Not to appreciate these factors would appear, at the least, careless.

In order to dissect this issue a little more fairly, a very brief overview of recent history is essential. These territories were the nucleus of the anti-soviet afghan insurgency in the 1980s. Pashtun tribes straddling the Durand Line share a common heritage, culture and traditions. After the soviets withdrew, several foreign fighters settled in the area. The only business they knew was war. The 1990s saw a sustained campaign in Afghanistan. Pakistani state elements were front and center in this effort in the hopes of setting up the much vaunted strategic depth they craved. The efforts culminated in the setting up of the Taliban Emirate in Afghanistan. However, the natural recalcitrance of a pedantic Afghan coupled with an equally pedantic interpretation of Islamic Sharia undermined our strategic dreams and the Emirate soon developed a defiant will of its own. The ambience was ripe for exploitation by the fugitive Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida, which they accomplished to the hilt. The Pakistani tribes were sympathetic to the Arab exiles as well as their afghan compatriots now ruling that country. Obviously, at that time, there was no direct pressure on them to do anything differently.

Then came September 11, 2001. In one day the entire geopolitical landscape of the world changed. Pakistan had to make an instant decision, and indeed General Musharraf made that call famously in twelve hours. Pakistan simply had no choice. America was wounded and was seeing red. Any Pakistani leader would have come to that conclusion and that quickly. The US Armed Forces subsequently invaded Afghanistan. The inevitable pressure on the Afghan Taliban as well as their Arab guests lead to their migrating over to Pakistan, especially after the Tora Bora engagement in December 2001 as well as well the erstwhile Operation Anaconda in Shah i Kot Valley in spring 2002. In addition, other elements, like Tajik mercenaries under Tahir Yuldshev of the erstwhile Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan found refuge in FATA. 

The Pakistani Pashtun tribes welcomed these terrorists and considered it an extension of Pashtunwali to give them safe harbor, support and succor. The North and South Waziristan areas, staging grounds for afghan fighters for decades were familiar territory for those fleeing the fighting in Afghanistan. Another ready vehicle available to these insurgents was the Tehrik Nifaz Shariat Mohammadi: an organization agitating for imposition of shariat since 1992. It was originally based out of the Malakand Agency but quickly increased its sphere of influence, especially to Bajour Agency and absorbed many elements from Afghanistan. They had ready access to a network of Salafist maddrassas. Radio and the airwaves were utilized to great effect. The local population was primitive and uneducated. Some fell prey to the highly intoxicating propaganda brew of religion, jehad, shraia and martyrdom. Others were cowed into submission. Very quickly it became clear that we were now incubating the next Frankenstein’s monster in our own backyard and it was about to strike inwards. The timing was highly inconvenient: this was the exact time when the US was demanding for us to shut off all oxygen to help them choke the Afghan Taliban. 

This then is the crux of the matter. The stance of these trouble makers infiltrating the tribal areas pitched them against the considered stance of the state. Pakistan, now under great pressure from the US to deliver, deemed it a National Security imperative to regain control and initiative in these areas. Moderate tribal elders, impotent to act themselves and too scared to openly side with the government, pledged neutrality should the army take matters in their own hands to deal with the infiltrators. It therefore became inevitable that the army would need to move in to ensure the security of the state. This began in July of 2002 when the Army entered the Tirah valley. The military operation had started. This was the first time since partition that the Pakistan Army had entered FATA. It must be stressed that the initial incursions were made with tacit consent of the elders of FATA.

The process of transition from being Afghan/Arab sympathizers to a fully fledged anti state guerrilla force took many more years. In the early years after the Army incursion, small militant outfits, operating independently, began networking together and started assuming an identity distinct from the Afghan Taliban. In the period between 2002-2004, they systematically targeted the moderate tribal elders and maliks: in just this two year period they assassinated more than 200 such tribal leaders who they accused of collaborating with the Army or the US. This not only stifled any attempts at resistance but also eliminated established local leadership and governance mechanisms. A void was  created into which the leadership of these guerrilla groups slipped in. These poorly organized tribal elements were now blossoming into an agency wide insurgent force. This situation was exploited by extremist sectarian parties like Lashkar e Jhangvi and other criminal elements from settled Pakistan. They found it expedient to base themselves in FATA and carry out their nefarious operations under the guidance, support and protection of the Pakistani Taliban. This lead to extension of TTP operations into settled Pakistan in the form of assassinations, sectarian killings and subversion. Predictably, the attacks on the Army became more effective – the ferocity of the battle of Wana in 2004 is a case in point.

The gravity of this emerging menace was quite apparent to both the Pakistan and US leadership but for different reasons. For Pakistan, this insurgency had direct consequences for the settled areas. The US was concerned this would further hamper the Pakistan Army’s capability to provide the necessary anvil against which the hammer of ISAF would strike to crush the Afghan Taliban. In view of the situation on the eastern borders, a full scale ground offensive by Pakistan Army was not advisable. Any sustained ground offensive by the US was ruled out due to political sensitivities. It was therefore decided to attempt decapitation of the leadership of this emerging nexus (mostly a Pakistani request) and continue attempts at liquidating the leadership of Alqaida as well as the Afghan Taliban (mostly a US interest). Initially tactical airstrikes were utilized – one such USAF sortie successfully killed Nek Muhammad Wazir in 2004. Subsequently, UAV with hellfire missiles were used to take out putative targets. Unavoidably, such tactics lead to very high profile visible collateral damage as well as widespread reaction. This, unfortunate as it was, became a very convenient rallying cry for resistance.

On December 14, 2007, the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) officially came into existence. Baitullah Mehsud (South Waziristan) became the leader, Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadar (North Waziristan) became the Senior Vice President while Maulvi Faqir Muhammad (Bajaur Agency) became the third in line. Building on this success, Mehsud then struck up an ideological alliance with the Afghan Taliban, creating the Shura Ittehad Ul Mujahideen in February 2009, accepting Mullah Omar as the Amir-ul-Momineen. This however seems to have been mostly symbolic with no significant strategic or material camaraderie.

This amorphous organization has since styled itself as the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan under its current leader Hakim Ullah Mehsud. The stated aims of the TTP are to enforce Sharia, unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan and perform “defensive jihad against the Pakistan army.” They demand the abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA area and have pledged to refuse future peace deals with the government of Pakistan. After the siege at Red Mosque in Islamabad in July 2007, they included release of Imam Abdul Aziz as a stated aim as well. The US and Pakistan Armies cooperated closely in waging an aerial war to decapitate the TTP leadership all through 2008 and 2009. Baitullah Mehsud himself was assassinated in August 2009 in a UAV strike. However, over the years, the resistance has continued forcing more or less a persistent state of war in the tribal areas. The Pakistan Army has had to mount repeated and very costly (man and material) operations to keep the movement at bay.

So this is where we are. A third of our army is deployed in FATA and KPK and has suffered thousands of casualties. The TTP remains an effective guerrilla force, battle hardened and trained after decades of experience in precisely this kind of warfare. It is quite clear that Pakistan Army cannot just get up and walk out of there. They cannot stay deployed forever either – as Sun Tzu declared “there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited”. It is time to re-evaluate available options and chalk out some serious, long term solutions. We remain at a disadvantage, hemorrhaging blood and treasure, so long as a stalemate continues. 

Some politicians want to negotiate a peace with the TTP. I think this will be unwise. Suing for peace when in a position of strength is magnanimity and is understood and appreciated as such. Asking for peace when in a crouch is a euphemism for surrender. If we think that by conceding the state’s sovereign right over FATA and a large swathe of KPK to the TTP we will achieve a just and lasting peace, we are deluding ourselves. The adversary will rightly consider this a victory and continue to encroach further, slice by slice. Their stated desire is to change the very nature of the Paksitani State and rebuild it in their vision of a what true Islamic Sharia’ State should look like. They are not going to stop in FATA.

There needs to be a comprehensive, coordinated approach to this operation with a plan looking over the horizon, not day to day engagements. This effort will only succeed if the politicians, the army as well as the intelligence conglomerate identify this as the biggest military threat we face today, which it is. Convergence of strategic, operational and tactical vision in the political and military chain of command is essential. This may be the most difficult alignment to achieve. Our army’s strategic focus, with some justification, remains the eastern border. Unless the army agrees to move assets to the western border, any such effort will fail. To their credit, the current army leadership has begun attempting such a pivot. Our political leaderships, past and present, unfortunately have proven completely clueless and inept to deal with the tough reality facing us. This conflict has to be nationally owned as such by our body politic to create national consensus, drive public support and provide the necessary milieu for the Army to undertake this difficult war. 

Regrettably, our approach to this problem has been ad hoc and tempered by many competing, tangential considerations. The usual cycle has run like this: A village or community is taken over by the insurgents. The inept local government and police watch (or collude) as the problem magnifies and becomes more urgent. Then the police throw their hands up and the FC is sent out. The FC, comprising local Pashtun recruits, is ill trained, incompetent and thoroughly infiltrated by the enemy. In most cases, the FC gets mauled up precipitating a situation where the Army has to come in. The Army goes in heavy, often supported by artillery and air power, resulting in heavy collateral damage, which understandably creates reaction. Numerous such cycles have been repeated over the last decade. There have been notable exception and I will be remiss not to applaud them –  the operation the Army in Swat was very successful, and valuable lessons have been learnt from that experience. But in general,  the army have tried to deal with the TTP as a standing army, and have aimed and planned destruction of organized, armed groups. They have looked for concentrations of the enemy and have launched sallies from their fortifications against such groups. This intermittent engagement strategy is a modification of traditional battlefield approach but runs contrary to every lesson of counterinsurgency (COIN) learned from successes or failures in Vietnam, Kashmir, Iraq, Afghanistan and Ireland, amongst many other places. What we have done so far has very heavy undertones of our previous performances in East Pakistan and Baluchistan, with comparable results (again, Swat being an exception). Modern COIN operations work on the general principles of “Disperse, protect and reconstruct”. We have mostly tried the dispersion part of it, poorly and haphazardly, and this obviously will not be successful.

A study of modern COIN operations elaborates one basic fact: Successful COIN is 80% political and 20% military. An equally important aspect of COIN operations, distinct from traditional warfare, is that it is all about people, not real estate. The primary initial aim of a COIN strategy must be denying the insurgents the most important element – not land, not resources but the population itself. According to the famous edict of Chairman Mao, people are like water in which the guerrilla seeks to thrive as fish. Thus it is above all a battle for the hearts and minds of the population at large. This is where the political arm of the state comes in with their vast administrative, development and social resources. This has been a major weakness thus far with some exceptions. Plans for economic, civil and administrative improvement should be contemporaneous to, and flow in unison with the initial military assaults.

To my mind, a successful operation in FATA will necessarily comprise several overlapping phases:

1. Escalation: After careful sector-wise review, the army will need to identify specific areas for simultaneous initial incursions. North Waziristan remains the ultimate prize. I do not see a solution to the larger problem without pacification of North Waziristan. Mustering a suitable force ratio is imperative. In a study carried out in the US Naval War College, it was established that anti-guerrilla operations generally met with success if the force ratio was maintained at 9:1. Our efforts till now have suffered because of a shortage of available troops, turning this endeavor into a game of whack-a-mole. This has to be an operation with capability to go live simultaneously in most areas of interest to deny terrorists the mobility to run from high pressure to low pressure areas. The primary goal of the incursions should be to defeat and drive off organized militant enemy groups and immediately set up security zones for population protection. The enemy will need to be decapitated via direct action; tactical air strikes by PAF or UAV attacks by ISAF will be required. 

2. Population Security: The screening and security of non-militant civilian population is of primary importance and must be an integral component of the operational plan as was very aptly demonstrated during the Swat operation. Ground incursion must be followed by liberation of the specific “Demonstration Zones” which will need to be kept viable by the Army. This cannot be accomplished by staying in garrisons. Change in military tactical doctrine and procedural routines will be required. Creation of these fire-free zones is essential to bring in some semblance of peace in the population centers. The population under protection also needs to feel secure that the insurgents will not be allowed to return. These “Demonstration Zones” become the foci for re-entrenchment. Efforts must be made to deplete the combatant militant strength by providing credible inducements to vulnerable militant groups. The cardinal key to success thus is to identify the hard-core, extreme elements and create an opportunity for the rest to rejoin the mainstream. 

3. Security: Conventional military doctrine focuses on clearing territory. In re-entrenchment operations, security has to focus on populations instead. But this is not, cannot be a one way proposition. The local population will need help to stand up for themselves. Traditionally, this has been attempted by forming lashkars, an unmitigated disaster thus far. In the past decade, many members of these ineffective lashkars have been assassinated by the insurgents for suspected collusion. As punishment for cooperation with the Army, the insurgents have burned hundreds of schools and destroyed other institutions, killed prominent elders and paralyzed all confidence in any other source of power but theirs. This has demoralized any local incentive to resist. This trend will need to be reversed.  Local lashkars will remain indispensable for any re-entrenchment effort. They will need to be protected and supported while performing civic duties as well as in battle. For quite some time,  regular army units or rapid deployment detachments will have to be placed so as to respond immediately to assist them. The lashkars as well as the population at large need to feel assured that they would have day to day security, not a cameo in the next operation. The Army must not stand down till the entire region has been pacified, slice by slice, reversing the insurgent’s strategy.

4. Organization: A military operation in isolation will fail. As soon as targeted areas are secured, the army needs to start civil organization of the areas under active control. Local lashkars, as noted, can form the first scaffold for control. Small community councils, fashioned after Jirgas, must immediately be put in place. The idea is to re-establish a traditional tribal power and administrative structure. The Taliban mullahs have usurped the role of tribal elders, political leaders as well as local jurists, centralizing all social, civic and religious authority with themselves.  Once they are driven off, these roles must be reverted back into the hands of the community. 

5. Capacity building:  The talent pool in these areas is shallow and this deficiency will have to be met. The tribal areas are a mish mash of crisscrossing administrative structures. The focus of development should be building capacity in the civil structures and initiate integration with the bureaucracy of KPK. Simplification on the lines of provincial bureaucratic lines utilizing local civil servants as much as feasible would be helpful. Basic administration should be localized and protected by the security set up. In time, amalgamation of FATA with KPK should be a goal.

6. Economic Stimulus: All these areas will need large scale humanitarian aid in the short term. This is a worthy investment. At the same time village level initiatives need to be introduced to encourage economic activity. Large parts of these areas depend upon agriculture. Agriculture development teams could help farmers from seed to market activities in the agricultural cycle. The new set up will need to roll out a lavish reconstruction program. Schools need to be rebuilt. Roads, dispensaries, hospitals and above all creation of jobs. If we do not want to shed our blood on those mountains, we will have to throw money at the problem. The US was supposed to have supported setting up industrial zones in the region to provide routes of employment. That help does not seem forthcoming any more. However, it remains an excellent idea and we should push such initiatives through wherever possible. The Army, with support from Abu Dhabi, has made some roads which again is an excellent initiative.

7. The Idea War: The most effective tool the insurgents have wielded is religious propaganda. In today’s battles, public perception is driven by assuming and maintaining control of the message and narrative. As soon as re-entrenchment commences the security forces need to exert control over mosques and pulpits as well as the airways. In these areas, toxic and intolerant salafist propaganda has been the dominant theological dispensation for the past several decades. This will need to be purged and mainstream, moderate religious education brought back.

8. The ink drop effect: Once seeds of re-entrenchment have been placed in population centers, the range of the operation will slowly need to expand to the fringes of the demonstration zones, absorbing more and more of the region. This allows us to start at the most favorable areas, maximizing chances of initial success, and then increasing the radius and range of operation. This has been the model of all recent COIN operations. 

9. Withdrawal: Withdrawal of the army needs to be as deliberate as its introduction. Once the area is able to support itself, the civilian infrastructure will be tasked administrative responsibility while the lashkars local security control. The FC and army will remain garrisoned in the area for a foreseeable time in the future to provide support as necessary. The army will do a reverse of the ink drop effect and eventually withdraw completely.

There is substantial outside support for these groups. Where there is an opportunity, those who would like to harm the country will capitalize on it. I feel the strongest deterrent to outside meddling is to change the facts on the ground. I have deliberately not addressed this aspect in detail as that is another story.