11 Giugno 2024
As Europe and the Middle East are still grappling with the political, humanitarian and economic consequences of the Gaza war, the long-standing issue of Palestinian energy opportunities remains at stake.
The Israel-Hamas war represents a shocking departure from the political and economic trends that appeared to be developing in the Mena region over the recent years. On one hand, the longstanding rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, prominently manifested in the Yemeni civil war, experienced a temporary pause through mediation efforts facilitated by China. On the other hand, the region seemed poised to enter a new era of widespread cooperation between several Arab nations and Israel, initially signaled by the signing of the Abraham Accords.
This trend of reconciliation between the Jewish state and its historical rivals was expected to encompass new potential partners, including Saudi Arabia, a key actor in the Sunni Arab world. The prospect of Saudi Arabia and Israel establishing formal diplomatic relations was viewed as a significant positive development for the political and economic dynamics of the Mena region. Some even suggested that these dynamics could lay the groundwork for addressing the Palestinian question, potentially leading to the establishment of a true Palestinian state. However, recent events are currently showing us how these aspirations have been, in fact, overly optimistic.
The outbreak of conflict following the events of October 7 and the subsequent incursion into Gaza by Israel have further exacerbated the uncertainties concerning Palestine’s future path. One critical element for any country’s national security is its energy framework, encompassing aspects such as production, transformation, delivery, and consumption. However, the Palestinian territories find themselves lacking substantive autonomy within the energy sector, heavily reliant on Israel for approximately 87% of their electricity requirements.
Moreover, Palestine lacks a domestic fossil fuel industry and is entirely dependent on Israel and neighboring states such as Jordan and Egypt for energy procurement. The presence of Israeli occupation and settlements within the West Bank has severely hampered the Palestinian National Authority’s (Pna) capacity to exercise meaningful governance over its essential resources. Tel Aviv has maintained a strict policy of energy isolation against Palestine, thereby ensuring its subordination in discussions concerning future energy-related developments and opportunities. From Israel’s perspective, this policy proves strategically advantageous, particularly in managing Palestine’s engagements with external stakeholders. By maintaining Palestine’s reliance on Israeli energy, the Jewish state can effectively mitigate the influence of rival states that might seek to use Palestinian energy needs to expand their own regional influence.
Energy has become a significant focal point in Israel in recent years, following the exploitation of gas fields within its exclusive economic zone (Eez). This transition has shifted Israel from an energy-dependent country to a prominent natural gas exporter, providing significant political and economic advantages.
Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), the establishment of an Eez grants a state exclusive rights to explore and exploit maritime resources, including fossil fuels, within a 200 nautical mile radius from its territorial waters. Despite Israel not being a signatory to Unclos, it has delineated its Eez through domestic legislation and bilateral agreements. On the other hand, the Palestinian Authority, a Unclos signatory, faces complexities in establishing its Eez due to its non-state status under international law. In the early 2000s, simultaneously with Israel’s gas discoveries, the Pna granted exploration rights to British Gas (Bg), leading to the discovery of the relatively large Gaza Marine gas field, estimated to hold approximately 1 trillion cubic feet (around 32 billion cubic meters) of natural gas reserves. However, political issues, such as Hamas taking control of Gaza in 2007 and Israel’s objections to Palestinian sovereignty over its claimed Eez, have hindered the field’s development.
Moreover, the Oslo Accords recognized the Pna’s jurisdiction over waters extending up to 20 nautical miles from its coast, encompassing Gaza Marine, yet also permitted Israel to regulate maritime traffic within this zone for security purposes. Consequently, Israel has exerted control over the Pna’s energy initiatives, maintaining dominance over Palestinian affairs. Tensions escalated further when Palestine was excludedfrom discussions regarding Eez partitioning between Israel, Egypt, and Cyprus during the 2018 East Mediterranean Gas Forum (Emgf).
However, prior to the onset of conflict in June 2023, Israel quietly opened a window of opportunity for further development of the Gaza Marine gas field within a cooperative framework involving the Pna and Egypt. This collaborative effort was anticipated to entail revenue-sharing agreements from gas field operations and the establishment of security guarantees deemed necessary by Israel. Under the terms of the agreement, a consortium led by Egypt’s Egas would oversee gas extraction, with Egypt purchasing the gas and transporting it via a gas pipeline to the port city of Arish, facilitating Lng export to Europe.
Egas’ would obtain a 45% stake in the Gaza Marine concession, while the remaining portion would be divided between the Palestine Investment Fund and the Federation of Arab Contractors (each obtaining a 27.5% share). The notion of leveraging economic cooperation and development as instruments to foster peaceful relations is not new. However, the significance lies in the unprecedented nature of this deal between historical adversaries, particularly considering the Pna’s lack of autonomy in energy production and security matters.
According to a study conducted by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, several factors likely influenced Israel’s decision to authorize operations in the gas field at that juncture. One plausible reason would see Israel exploit the heightened tensions between Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip to project an image of itself as a promoter of Palestine’s economic opportunities and a mediator of peace.
Additionally, it is suggested that the anticipated Israeli-Saudi agreement may have influenced this dynamic, potentially laying the groundwork for further economic cooperation in energy negotiations within the region. Another possible incentive is Israel’s recognition of the strategic importance of managing regional challenges for the collective benefit of the region through enhanced economic development and infrastructural connectivity. This consideration is particularly significant given the potential for infrastructural links between Saudi oil fields and Israeli and Egyptian ports to enhance security in the supply of critical fossil fuel products to the European market.
Such connections could circumvent the vulnerability associated with transit through the Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb straits, which have been subject to instances of sabotage in recent years. This vulnerability is currently highlighted by the Houthi blockade in the Red Sea, underscoring the legitimacy of such concerns. In hindsight, it is conceivable that Israel perceived limited cooperation with Palestine as preferable to complete isolation, recognizing the potential long-term benefits of such collaboration. Nevertheless, Hamas’s stance in this scenario remains ambiguous, as Israel did not disclose any official engagement with the nationalist paramilitary organization concerning the Gaza Marine agreement.
As the conflict in Gaza shows no sign of de-escalation, predicting the future of Gaza Marine and, more broadly, Palestinian energy prospects is challenging. While the outcome will primarily depend on whether Israel intends to remain in the Strip or withdraw after the conflict, in either scenario it is highly unlikely that the Pna will benefit in the energy sector. If Israel opts to occupy Gaza, then Palestine would certainly lose any claims or rights over its territorial and Eez waters, thereby losing any opportunity to exploit the Gaza Marine gas field.
This would be the worst-case scenario for the Pna, potentially leading to increased restrictions and further Israeli occupation in the West Bank. Some sources speculate that one of Israel’s real motives for the Gaza invasion is to secure offshore gas fields, pursuing a wider goal of asserting sovereignty over the Gaza Strip and making the eradication of Hamas only an excuse. However, this theory lacks substance since it does not take into account the fact that Israel does not likely need Gaza Marine’s resources for its own economic benefits.
That is because that gas field is of a relatively small size compared to Israel’s far larger operational fields, such as Tamar, Leviathan, and Karish, which already ensure energy security and export opportunities. The reasons may be political to the utmost, since directly accessing Palestine’s limited offshore natural resources would prevent any initiative by the Pna, Hamas, or any other Palestinian political actor to develop its own energy strategy. The June 2023 accord, under current conditions, is unlikely to be implemented as initially expected. By targeting Hamas, Israel is likely signaling to the Pna that its room for maneuvers and legitimacy over the issue have decreased, implicitly blaming it for its inability to assert sovereignty over Gaza and denying it an equal standing in negotiations with Israel.
Another significant concern revolves around the potential responses of regional actors to Israel’s acquisition of full effective control over Gaza Marine. Egypt, in particular, would encounter substantial security, political, and economic challenges as it navigates its role as a mediator amidst domestic and regional pressures. The alteration of dynamics in Eastern Mediterranean gas politics, resulting from Israel’s control over Gaza Marine, could have far-reaching implications for regional stability and maritime security. This is especially pertinent concerning Turkey’s interests and ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara would not favorably welcome the forced appropriation of Palestine’s energy resources by Israel and the subsequent economic arrangements the latter may negotiate with Egypt and Cyprus. Such developments could form the basis for heightened tensions among neighboring states, revolving around disputes over resource exploitation and territorial claims. Conversely, certain regional actors may perceive opportunities for strategic advantage amid these shifts. Saudi Arabia, in alignment with its Vision 2030 plan, which also aims at diversifying energy sources and supply routes, may consider exploring new infrastructure projects with Israel to bolster the security of its exports to Europe and to enhance infrastructural connections in the Arabian peninsula.
In summary, a lasting occupation of Gaza and its energy resources by Israel would undoubtedly escalate tensions and instability in the region, significantly affecting regional cooperation and security. Such a scenario could prolong the suspension of the EastMed gas pipeline project and perpetuate the Houthi blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb strait, further disrupting the Middle Eastern and European energy market and affecting some actors disproportionately more than others. No matter how these scenarios are analyzed, it would be overly optimistic to expect Palestine to directly benefit from what are theoretically its own energy resources.
Categories: Gaza, Israel, Middle East, Palestine, War, War crimes