mei.edu: Sectarian identities could not be politicized unless differences in beliefs, values, and historical memory compelled religious groups to collective action around particularistic identities. The critical question, however, that demands an answer in explaining sectarian conflict is: why now?  Why do sectarian conflicts erupt at particular moments in time and not at other moments? Sunni-Shi’i relations, for example, have not always been conflict-ridden nor was sectarianism a strong political force in modern Muslim politics until relatively recently. What factors contributed to this change? Drawing on research from South and Southeast Asia, Vali Nasr has suggested that we must take into account the agency of state actors in identity mobilization.[1] Nasr’s insight helps deepen our theoretical understanding of identity mobilization in that it pushes the conversation beyond primordial differences and elite manipulation and focuses attention on state behavior and state-society relations. The national context is essential for understating sectarian conflict in the Middle East today.

National Contexts

While most Muslim majority societies are Sunni, comprising about 85-90 percent of the total global Muslim population, Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Bahrain are Shi’a majority societies. Significant Shi‘i populations also live in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Syria.[2] Critically, what these societies share in common is that most of their political systems are decidedly non-democratic and various forms of authoritarianism dominate the political landscape.  It is this overarching fact that determines the ebb and flow of political life and influences the relationship between sects, the rise of sectarianism, and the behavior of political and religious leaders.

Authoritarian states in the Muslim world have several distinguishing features that influence sectarian relations.  They suffer from a crisis of legitimacy and as a result they closely monitor and attempt to control civil society by limiting access to information and the freedom of association of their citizens.  Joel Midgal’s concept of a “weak state” best describes these regimes.[3]  In his formulation, “weak states” often cannot and do not control sections of the country, both within urban and rural areas, which they claim sovereignty over.[4] While the state is too weak to dominate society, it is often strong enough to manipulate and to effectively respond to crises that threaten national security and regime survival.[5]

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