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Good Muslims, good citizens? An intersectional approach to Muslims’ everyday (hidden) resistance tactics in Belgium

The Exclusion and Political Engagement of Ethnic Minorities in Deliberative and Representative Democracy

Samira AzabarORCID Icon

Pages 567-586 | Received 31 May 2023, Accepted 23 Apr 2024, Published online: 03 May 2024

In this article

ABSTRACT

This paper explores Muslim participants’ political endeavours, aiming to tackle their marginalization in a secular racialized environment. Drawing on critical race scholarship (Du Bois), resistance studies (de Certeau, Scott) and lived experiences captured by in-depth interviews with Muslims in Belgium, I focus on everyday hidden resistance tactics enacted by my research subjects to challenge the status quo. I find my research participants aiming to counter racialization through everyday (hidden) practices such as reversing the Muslim gaze, modelling their religious behaviour as a form of da’wa and building up a counterpower to achieve recognition as citizen. Second, this study shows the salience of Du Bois’ notion of double consciousness – or Muslim participants seeing themselves through the eyes of the dominant group – shaping subordinate forms of political resistance.

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Introduction

      ‘Where there is power, there is resistance’ (Foucault Citation1978, 95–96)

In the post-9/11 era, Muslims are mainly stereotyped as the dangerous Other opposing democracy and western values (Fadil, Farid, and Sarah Citation2015; Islam Citation2020; Said Citation1978). Being Muslim is thus seen as incompatible with modernity, situating Muslims as outsiders of a modern national imaginary, and thus as non-citizens. This negative portrayal of Muslims and Islam has also been constructed, shared, maintained and strengthened by media (Ahmed and Matthes Citation2016; Rane, Jacqui, and John Citation2014). Academic work refers to this othering of Muslims as a form of structural racism, Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism (Cainkar and Selod Citation2018). Owing to an enduring and widespread racialization in the continent, (radical) right-wing parties in Western Europe have called for restrictions on the number of immigrants in order to protect the dominant culture, whereas left-wing parties frequently take positions conflicting with Muslims’ religious interests Muslims (Bray Citation2011; Fadil, Farid, and Sarah Citation2015).

Muslim minorities are therefore required to negotiate their space in secular liberal democracies. Given that Muslims are the fastest growing religious community in the West and tend to be negatively framed and discriminated against (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights Citation2017; Meer Citation2010; Mescoli Citation2019; Pew Research Center Citation2017a), research is needed on how Muslims cope with the political challenges they encounter, and how they aim for recognition as co-members of a polity. As previous research focused on recognized forms of political participation, such as electoral and nonelectoral activities (Ayers and Hofstetter Citation2008; Azabar and Thijssen Citation2021), this paper pays special attention to everyday hidden resistance tactics enacted by the subjugated, in casu Muslims in Flanders (Belgium).

The main research question is thus the following: Which everyday tactics do Belgian Muslims employ to resist being marginalized in racialized societies? I first explore what informs these everyday (hidden) resistance tactics, using Du Bois’ concept of double consciousness (Du Bois Citation[1999] 1903). These insights reveal how Muslims see themselves through the eyes of the dominant majority, which influences their political behaviour. I investigate this behaviour in a more secularized environment, Belgium, where religion in general (but Islam in particular) is viewed with more suspicion, and where there is a wish to relegate religion to the private sphere (Mescoli Citation2019). Previous studies on Muslims’ participation accounting for religiosity were mainly conducted in the UK and US, where religion is not only more embedded in society, but also general religiosity is relatively high (Cesari Citation2014; Esmer and Petterson Citation2007).

Drawing on 17 in-depth interviews with self-identifying Muslims, I unpack Muslim minorities’ resistance practices while accounting for their impaired civic status in Flanders (the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium). Although it is one of the smaller countries in Western Europe, Belgium is a well documented case due to the institutional situation of the country in which Islam has been recognized as an official religion since 1973 (Fadil, Farid, and Sarah Citation2015). Furthermore, the recent international conflicts resulting in the departure of five thousand Europeans to the Middle East between 2012 and 2014 have also highlighted Belgium as one of the countries with the highest ratio of ‘foreign fighters’ in Europe (Sealy and Modood Citation2020). The attacks in Paris and Belgium in 2015 and 2016 have furthermore reinforced the debates on Muslims, heightening the securitization of Islam, which in turn has intensified the portrayal of Muslims as terrorists. Moreover, despite longstanding institutional recognition, the visible presence of Islam in the public sphere is seen with unease in Belgium, contributing to (policy) restrictions on Muslim religious practices, such as a ban on veils and religious slaughter (Fadil, Farid, and Sarah Citation2015). To be clear, in this paper I do not consider the category Muslim to necessarily refer to a pious disposition, but rather understand it as ‘an identity that may have religious, racial, political, or cultural dimensions’ (Sinno Citation2012, 2). I therefore use the notion of Muslim and Muslimness interchangeably to refer to a subject position that is at the heart of the mechanisms of othering and which also deeply impacts how people come to understand themselves. This does not, however, preclude the coexistence of this notion of Muslimness with other modes of subjectivation (i.e. gender, ethnicity, faith).

My contributions are twofold. First, inspired by the work of Nasar Meer (Citation2010), I draw on Du Bois’ (Du Bois Citation[1999] 1903) notion of double consciousness to examine how Muslim participants experience processes of racialization in Flanders (Belgium). I hereby acknowledge how intersectional subjectivities are informed by the dialectic between the individual and society in a gendered racialized environment. Furthermore, as previous studies on Muslims’ political participation focused mainly on (non)institutionalized political participation or public resistance, I highlight the subordinate forms of political resistance, over and above recognized modes of political participation. I employ the notion of everyday hidden resistance practices as theorized by de Certeau (Citation1980) and Scott (Citation1985) to document these. As they focused on class struggles in their work, I pay special attention to Muslims’ everyday hidden resistance as intersected with, for example, gender and religion.

The findings show that my research participants engage in everyday resistance tactics to rearticulate the widespread gendered and racialized constructions imposed on them by the dominant group aiming to access equal rights as citizens. This occurs firstly through an inversion of the (Muslim) gaze, as some research participants voiced to gather information about the dominant group in order to understand and challenge their marginalization. Secondly, the Islamic repertoire is actively brought to bear to counter these dominant negative stereotypes (i.e. actively referring to how Islam promotes cohesive and constructive values), next to representing Islam by embodying being a good Muslim as a form of da’wa which equals being a good citizen. Thirdly, acknowledging that effecting a substantive transformation is an endeavour, my research participants invest in building up a counterpower and counterspaces through intergenerational transmission and the cultivation of alternative sites of engagement. These three different – but intertwined – everyday hidden resistance tactics are informed by intersecting powers and Muslim participants’ positionalities. Interestingly, these everyday resistance tactics of participants are shaped and influenced by what (Du Bois, Citation[1999] 1903 identified as a double consciousness: Muslims seeing themselves through the eyes of the dominant group. All in all, the study demonstrates that my research participants resist the discourses and practices that marginalize them by employing covert political actions.

Theoretical framework

Muslim resistance in a gendered racialised environment

Previous research has interpreted racialization as a process of ‘ascribing sets of characteristics viewed as inherent to members of a group because of their physical or cultural traits’ (Cainkar and Selod Citation2018, 170). For instance, Muslims have been constructed as the backward and dangerous Other due to their Islamic faith. In a post-9/11 society, these racialized images – shared by media – are still vividly present and have been intensified under the guise of the War on Terror (Ahmed and Matthes Citation2016). Additionally, scholars have argued that racialization processes are gendered: as terrorism resulted in the criminalization of Muslim men as (potential) terrorists, Muslim women are perceived as oppressed and a cultural threat to the Western ideals of gender equality. This gendered and racialized discourse is strengthened even further when visible markers are involved, such as a long beard, Islamic dress or a veil, making Muslims more vulnerable to anti-Muslim racism (Abu Lughod Citation2002; Islam Citation2020). Subsequently, several international organizations have condemned the discrimination in the labour and housing market pushing Muslims to the margins (Bayrakli and Hafez Citation2019; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights Citation2017). The question remains how Muslims aim to navigate these challenges.

In the following sections, I draw on the critical work of Meer (Citation2010, Citation2019) engaging with Du Bois’ double consciousness to unravel how these racialized processes affect Belgian Muslim subjectivities (and their political actions). Second, I elaborate on the influential work of de Certeau (Citation1980) and Scott (Citation1985) on everyday hidden resistance acts practiced by the subjugated as a way to belong.

Du Bois’ double consciousness and muslims

Several scholars working on Muslims’ subjectivities in the UK and US have been drawn to Du Bois’ double consciousness to understand the formation of the Muslim self in a racialized context (Islam Citation2020; Meer Citation2010). Du Bois, Citation[1999] 1903 coined the term double consciousness in the context of race relations in the United States as an internal struggle to reconcile being both Black and American, by referring to a

two-ness – an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, … He [the African–American] simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows. (Du Bois Citation[1999] 1903, 10–11)

According to the author, implicit and explicit power relations impede this process, as on the one hand one’s Americanness can point to citizenship, while on the other hand one’s Blackness otherwise and situates the same individual outside the nation. This duality leads to ‘always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others’ (Du Bois Citation[1999] 1903), as our idea of ourselves – who we claim to be – is formed from the dialectic between how we see ourselves and how we think other people see us.

This duality has equally been found to be present in how Muslims relate to themselves in European contexts. Scholars have argued that Muslims find themselves in a paradoxical position of ‘being intimately part of a polity while excluded from its public culture’, owing to a widespread negative portrayal of Muslims in the UK (Meer Citation2010, 43). This duality informs and shapes Muslims’ interactions with (and claims of belonging to) Muslim communities and the nation, affecting their political participation and social integration (Islam Citation2020; Meer Citation2010). Du Bois’ metaphor of the Veil – or the racialization that Muslims endure – is described as a one-way mirror through which the (Muslim) minority sees the majority, whereas the (dominant) majority sees only their own reflection and thus their ‘rightful’ dominance (Du Bois Citation[1999] 1903). Van Es (Citation2019, 377) explains how this stereotyping of Dutch Muslim minorities is ‘a process of boundary drawing between a modern, enlightened and emancipated Dutch [West] “us”, and a backward, traditional and patriarchal Muslim “them”’.

More recently, research has also viewed Du Bois’ double consciousness through an intersectional lens, stressing the salience of oppressing systems in addition to racism, such as patriarchy affecting minority women differently from minority men referring to a triple consciousness (race/religion-nation-gender) (Tibi Citation2010). They also explored how Muslim women internalize hegemonic discourses of the veil/Veil and try to break the ‘oppressed Muslim women’ stereotype. Being highly aware of how they are perceived – or what Du Bois described as a gift and burden when speaking of the second sight – Muslim women continuously reform the images imposed on them by the majority groups in their everyday interactions (Islam Citation2020, 442; Van Es Citation2019). Although the transformative potential of these everyday practices has been neglected, a renewed interest in de Certeau’s and Scott’s work emphasizes that resistance can take very different forms, even mundane practices of accommodation and non-confrontation integrated into daily life (Johansson and Vinthagen Citation2019, 9; Murru and Polese Citation2020).

Everyday hidden resistance practices

Following the resistance scholars Johansson and Vinthagen (Citation2019), I define everyday (hidden) resistance as ‘a pattern of acts (practice) done by someone subordinated in a power relation and that might (temporarily) undermine or destabilise (some aspect of) dominance’ (Citation2019, 9). These forms of politics are informal and non-organized, also referred to as infrapolitics or invisible politics, but are barely recognized as politics, compared to collective resistance (e.g. demonstrations) (Johansson and Vinthagen Citation2019). In his prominent work, Scott (Citation1985) makes a plea for acknowledging everyday hidden tactics as real politics. The author studied the everyday hidden tactics of Malaysian peasants in a rural class conflict, such as pilfering, sabotage and slander used to survive and challenge the domination of the elite because overt rebellion was at times too risky for the peasants.

Similarly, de Certeau (Citation1980) unravelled the everyday hidden tactics of the ordinary class (or consumers) as repeated manoeuvres challenging the power structures that discipline lives (or strategies) in liberal-democratic contexts. In his theoretical work, he emphasized how the repertoires of resistance take place in enemy territory. He highlighted the vital role of power relations in constraining the forms of resistance (who resists what, how, where and when), stressing how power and resistance are entangled in multiple and complex ways. In addition, echoing previous research, I agree with Johansson and Vinthagen (Citation2019) that visible forms of resistance may feed into infrapolitics and vice versa. In short, these two forms of resistance – public and hidden – are not mutually exclusive, but could rather be seen as complementary. While the previously cited studies focused on class struggles when identifying patterns of hidden political acts of the subjugated, I study Muslims’ everyday tactics to mitigate domination in secular societies.

The few available research on Muslims’ (hidden) resistance tactics document how West-Euuropean Muslims contest and challenge anti-Islamic discourses on Islam in order to belong to society (Fadil Citation2006; Jouili Citation2007; Van Es Citation2019). For instance, van Es (Citation2019) showed how Dutch Muslim women, active in religious organizations, act as ambassadors of Islam by monitoring their own behaviour in everyday interactions with non-Muslims and representing themselves as modern and emancipated, thus countering the ‘oppressed Muslim women’ narrative. She documented how interlocutors emphasized having a paid job or told their non-Muslim acquaintances how their husbands have cooked a nice meal to reshape the dominant portrayal of Muslim women (Van Es Citation2019, 381). Similarly, Jouili (Citation2007) revealed how Muslim women counter the negative portrayal of Islam by participating actively and successfully in society. This everyday struggle of Muslim women to represent Islam positively in a racialized society i.e. ‘by pursuing a professional career and thereby embodying the image of a modern Muslim women’ has been referred to as da’wa (Jouili Citation2007, 32). Da’wa thus entails more than the classical meaning of spreading the religious message, but could also be understood as representing Islam through deconstructing its negative portrayal. Fadil (Citation2006, 71) also demonstrated how Belgian Muslims organized activities to challenge mainstream representations of Muslims while offering positive accounts of Islam and Muslims in order to be acknowledged as citizens. As public opinion affects their everyday interactions and contributes to their societal marginalization, research participants linked a civic duty to a religious duty, thus ‘presenting active citizenship as a religious practice- as a message of Islam or da’wa’ (Fadil Citation2006, 72). These ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott Citation1985) or ‘tactics as art of the weak’ (de Certeau Citation1980) are individual and non-organized acts influencing (but not fully altering) power relations. As these tactics are contextualized and thus depending on the environments in which Muslims are navigating, I expand on the research context in the following section.

Flanders (Belgium) as a research context. From ethno-cultural to Muslim, but always the other

The majority of Muslims in Belgium are Moroccan or Turkish labour migrants and their descendants who moved to the country in the ‘60s, although in the last decade this reality has been altered by the influx of Muslims from Syria, Palestine and Afghanistan. Muslims make up about 7.6% of the total citizenryFootnote1 (Pew Research Center Citation2017b), and are mostly working-class and employed in low-skilled jobs (Fadil, Farid, and Sarah Citation2015, 224). Flanders is Belgium’s largest and most prosperous region, with a highly diverse population. Migration to Flanders was linked to the employment possibilities of the port in Antwerp, the coal mining region of Limburg and small scale industries in the province of East Flanders. The history of Flanders has also been marked by the distinct presence of far-right and nationalist ideologies through the far-right party Vlaams Belang and the nationalist conservative party NV-A. The debate around migration and integration of Muslims in Belgium has become increasingly polarized (Loobuyck and Meier Citation2014), and is currently one of society’s most controversial topics, resulting in the popularity of nationalist (N-VA) and radical right (Vlaams Belang) parties at the 2019 national elections in Belgium. Overall, the narrative of Muslims, and thus their demographic growth, as a problem is gaining the upper hand (Mescoli Citation2019).

Since the institutional recognition of Islam as an official faith in 1974, the socio-political position and cultural representation of Muslims has shifted from an ethno-cultural form of othering to a religious form of othering. While Muslims such as the Moroccans or Turks were initially viewed in the ‘70s and ‘80s in terms of their ethno-cultural characteristics, this gradually changed with the Salman Rushdie affair and the growing debates on the integration of Muslims focusing on practices such as the headscarf – thus constructing an imaginary around Muslims as religious Others (Fadil, Farid, and Sarah Citation2015; Mescoli Citation2019). This process escalated further after 9/11 with the growing securitization of Islam. Belgium had its own share of terror attacks, and is a much debated case due to having the highest ratio of foreign fighters in Europe (Sealy and Modood Citation2020). There is widespread discomfort and questioning as to whether Islam is compatible with Western values strengthening the idea of Muslims as a potential threat whose actions have to be monitored closely (Mescoli Citation2019). This discourse has facilitated restrictions on Muslim religious practices, such as a general ban on the burqa, on veils in schools and in some areas of the labour market, and barriers to the official recognition of mosques which have to pass a security screening by government institutions (Brems Citation2020). In addition to these exclusionary policies, reports point to Muslims as victims of discrimination in the fields of employment, education and housing. European Muslims seem to be overrepresented in low-paid jobs and unemployment, with below-average levels of education and living in poor housing conditions, thus facing barriers to engage with wider society (Bayrakli and Hafez Citation2019; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights Citation2017).

Method and data

I have conducted 17 in-depth semi-structured interviewsFootnote2 with self-identifying Muslims living in Flanders.Footnote3 In search of participants who self-identify as Muslim citizens, several organizations (e.g. youth, feminist, student, poverty organizations and mosques) were asked to put out a call for participants through their communication channels. I then used snowball sampling, asking the first interviewees whether they knew Muslims in their network willing to participate. Additionally, purposive sampling is used to ensure the presence of participants with a lower level of education.

The interviews include 13 second or third generationFootnote4 Muslims with a Moroccan background, two with a Turkish background and two converts with an ethnic majority background in Flanders. Out of these, 9 defined themselves as women, 7 as men and one as non-binary. The majority, 12 participants, are studying or have finished their higher education whereas five participants obtained (only) their secondary degree. The conversations took on average 1 hour 45 minutes (February-April 2021), exploring narratives through their personal (political) biographies, e.g. how they describe and evaluate the current political and social environment, their (un)conventional political participation, challenges and whether/how they try to change things. Lastly, I asked them about their (multiple) identity, with a focus on Muslimness due to the politicization of this aspect in Belgium. Due to COVID-19 measures, half of the interviews were conducted in person, respecting all the applicable conditions, the other half took place online using Skype or ZOOM. The names of the participants were altered in order to preserve anonymity. All interviews were transcribed and coded through a thematic analysis in order to structure the analyses.

All interviews were conducted by a recognizable Muslim women interviewer wearing a headscarf; this could generate a sense of familiarity and openness towards research participants, particularly those who feel othered. Questioning participants on sensitive topics and possible trauma requires a safe space; this could be achieved more easily by someone perceived by them as a member of the in-group who can relate to their experiences. However, it could also prevent participants from fully explaining their experiences because they assume these are obvious facts. The interviewer therefore stressed at the beginning of each interview that although some things might seem clear, more questions would be asked to verify whether the interviewer interpreted the responses correctly.

Findings

Double Muslim consciousness

The dominant portrayal of Muslims as the Other, and more specifically Muslim men as potential terrorists and Muslim women as oppressed, has been voiced by almost all participants when querying them about the current obstacles and challenges they face in society. This has created a sense of alienation, as they do not recognize themselves in these negative perceptions. This shows the awareness of Muslims about their social and political position characterized by the duality being located inside (being a citizen) and outside of the dominant society owing to their Muslimness – also described by Du Bois as double consciousness (Du Bois Citation[1999] 1903). For instance, Moussa (40y), a Muslim with a Moroccan background, unemployed and volunteering in a mosque, explained that he does not feel welcome in Belgium:

I don’t feel good here [in Belgium] … For instance, if we want something concerning Islam, then it’s always ‘no, we [non-Muslims] don’t go there’. Take the example of ritual slaughter; they keep hammering, and do not recognise mosques and all these other signals. Those signals make clear that they [non-Muslims] don’t want us [Muslims] here.

Moussa elaborated on his experiences with prejudices at his previous workplace owing to his Muslimness, explaining that he feels part of the underclass, firmly concluding: ‘They hate us, because we are Muslim’. Although this comment was strongly formulated, almost all respondents shared this feeling of being rejected by the majority from being full members of society. He furthermore discussed the fierce debates on religious issues and society’s fear of Islam, while contesting the hegemonic anti-Islamic discourse. Moussa is aware of how he is perceived as the Other, a potential terrorist dressed in a white abaya (a traditional Muslim garment) with a long black beard, claiming ‘it’s the way I look’. This othering is gendered as Muslim women participants described how people primarily see them as ‘the oppressed Muslim women’, without any agency. Wissam (38y), a policy officer working with her headscarf, elaborated on how she is continuously aware of and affected by the negative portrayal of Muslim women:

You are always perceived as the oppressed woman. Frankly, it’s tiring. Your opinion is not heard … How are Muslim women represented? As the oppressed women that need to be saved by a white man. That’s the image that reigns: we always need to be saved. That has to disappear, because people believe what they see on TV. They all are getting the wrong image of us.

By referring to ‘the wrong image’, Wissam emphasizes how non-Muslims do not see Muslims for who they truly are, but mostly through dominant representations. This is in line with earlier observations that drew on Du Bois’ double consciousness (Meer Citation2010).

As some of the interlocutors were converts to Islam, they shared how their conversion dramatically altered the way they were perceived. While they initially ‘belonged’ to the dominant society, this privilege was suddenly suspended as they became recognizable Muslims associated with the trope of the oppressed Muslim women. This change in perception particularly takes place when they wear a headscarf or explicitly out themselves as Muslim. Linda, a 31-year-old nurse, voiced: ‘When you wear a hijab, you throw away your white privileges’. Thus, Muslims’ racial experiences, and therefore experiences of Islamophobia, can differ depending on the visibility of their Muslimness. Although a growing body of research explores how Islamophobia affects Muslims differently (i.e gendered Islamophobia) (Fadil, Farid, and Sarah Citation2015; Mahmut Citation2021) expanding the interlocking systems of oppression (i.e. ethnicity) highlights not only the complexity of racialized processes affecting Muslims differently (i.e. converts), but also the ways in which they can navigate or challenge oppression.

Muslims’ everyday (hidden) resistance tactics to counter domination

Due to their racialized experiences, research participants stated that political engagement is needed to change the dominant narrative and to be perceived as a member of the society. The means and extent of this political engagement varies among participants, depending on their gender, age, education, resilience, insights into the complexity of Belgian politics and whether they believe that their acts could bring substantial changes. Similarly, Oskooii concluded that ‘any act of resistance is more likely to occur among individuals who not only have the material resources, but also have the psychological fortitude to confront the status quo or unwelcomed changes’ (2016, 614).

Most participants were in some way involved in countering the negative portrayal of Muslims, through demonstrations, petitions, op-eds in newspapers, advisory councils or debates to inform society about their experiences and the real world behind the Veil. The research participants seemed to be always informed of the majority’s view in their mobilizations and activities, having the dominant group continuously in mind (see Du Bois Citation[1999] 1903). Some participants described how careful they were in their (daily) interactions to not strengthen the widespread stereotypes about Muslims. For instance, Safa (42y) recognizes the importance of mass media to be seen and heard by the dominant group, but also pointed to the hostility she experienced, as the media framed her as either the oppressed or the dangerous Muslim woman concluding ‘It takes a lot of energy, and at the end the impact is not that big. So why the effort?’. She thus prefers environments where the focus is not on her Muslimness, but rather on her research, which enables her to help to eliminate inequalities in care. These modes of media participation are rather overt and more visible than the everyday hidden resistance tactics which scholars aim to study (de Certeau Citation1980; Scott Citation1985). In the following sections, we aim to gain a better understanding of Muslim participants’ everyday practices challenging power structures.

Reversing the gaze

Some participants aim to tackle negative portrayals of Muslims by gaining knowledge about how the majority society thinks. Participants believe that the mainstream media, together with political discussions about specific issues that concern them, can deliver insights into the mechanisms of racialization. Aiming to navigate power structures that are impossible to ignore, Ayse (24y, student) explains how important her education at the university was, in order to learn ‘how these (racialisation) processes work. I thought that I should at least have to know how things work behind the scenes [Veil], so that I would feel less powerless. And it did’. Similarly, Kamal (35y), a university-educated man who spent years volunteering and working in civil society organizations, reflects on his use of the media:

Yes, [I follow media] every day. I check websites of newspapers and the public broadcast. That’s the worldview of the elite. Through mainstream media, you know how the elite thinks. Keep your friends close, but your enemies closer … We have to try to penetrate through their worldview and strategies.

Interestingly, when talking about the elite producing power structures, he describes them as the enemy. This highlights an overall understanding of this environment as hostile and unsafe. However, rather than putting him off, he demonstrates an engagement with the medium in a vein that is similar to what de Certeau described as a tactic. The tactic here is to observe the mass media in an ethnographic way – to ‘know how the elite thinks’ – which, in turn, makes it possible to invert that gaze. The observed becomes the observer. Previous scholars have built upon Foucault’s notion of the panopticon (a prison design in which all prisoners can be watched by a single guard), revealing how Muslim minorities experience continuous scrutiny and discipline themselves due to an internalization of the gaze (Islam Citation2020; Van Es Citation2019). An inversion of the gaze to objectify the dominant majority may not, of course, be as powerful as overturning it, but turning it into a ‘site of investment’ becomes a strategy which allows Muslim participants to navigate it. An exceptional study of van Es (Citation2019) showed how Muslim women made strategically use of the panoptic gaze. Because Muslim women were hyper aware of the gaze, their words and deeds could at any time being linked to Islamic faith resulting in the policing of their behaviour in everyday interactions with non-Muslims stressing how emancipated and free Muslim women truly are.

In this hyper awareness of the self, in particular Muslim women participants feel persistently scrutinized in public spaces. Ayse, a 24-year-old student, experienced her presence in the European district in Brussels on a school outing as if she did not belong in this predominantly white, male environment because of people gazing. However, she experienced her bodily presence as a way of resisting the marginalization of Muslims: ‘You feel watched [due to my headscarf]. But it’s like telling [the dominant society] that I am here, they can’t ignore us’. An element which is visible and perceived as negative is voiced by Ayse as a hidden everyday resistance act to reject how her body is othered. Similarly, Jouili (Citation2007, 32) shows how veiled Muslim women in France emphasize the need to show they exist referring to being visible in the public sphere as a form of resistance to a laïque public sphere that excludes them. These examples also shows how visible minorities, in particular veiled women, can disrupt and invade male-dominated and white hegemonic spaces by their mere presence (Puwar Citation2004). Puwar asserts that spaces are not neutral, as gendered and racial power structures are produced and experienced, expatiating on how minorities challenge the power dynamics.

Doing Da’wa: modeling proper Islamic behavior

All research participants have voiced the importance of religion in their life, but also their strivings for recognition, emancipation and equality shaping the Muslim self and their worlds. As an example, Karim (47y), a city official, presented himself as ‘a devout Muslim’ who negotiates the concessions he has to make as a Muslim. As a Muslim, he believes that he should avoid gender-mixed places or places where alcohol is served unless his job requires him to be there. Due to the hostile context, he therefore advises Muslims to carefully consider the balance of power, and to make sacrifices in everyday interactions. Karim states the following:

Sometimes you have to adjust, because you have no other option. I, for instance, can’t demand to only willing to share my office with men. You know that’s not possible … Or not attend a reception at work because there will be alcohol because our religion says so. In a way, we – as Muslims – have to adjust to these situations.

Karim’s view echoes that of many other interlocutors who expressed a deep awareness and carefulness about how their conduct reflects upon other Muslims. They are not only seeking to make their own life easier but also of their Muslim community, since the actions of an individual Muslim reflect on all other Muslims. After all, Islam is viewed as, in essence, homogenous (Fadil, Farid, and Sarah Citation2015) and the action of one person can be oversimplified as representing the actions of all Muslims. This is akin to what Fernando (Citation2015) described as ‘the burden of representation’. Thus, research participants aiming to shift boundaries, Us vs Them, have to persuade the dominant group of the uselessness and inaccuracy of constructed boundaries while at the same time staying true to being Muslim, and still balancing this with living in a secular society. They look for the middle ground, striving to combine two subjectivities that are perceived as clashing (see Du Bois Citation[1999] 1903).

As subordinate groups are deemed to negotiate their space in the public sphere, most interviewees agreed that Muslims should do good even when hampered by tension and exclusion. My research participants underlined the importance of everyday encounters with non-Muslims in which they seek to reflect as little as possible the constructed racialized projections of the dominant group. One key principle is to stay polite in interactions discussing injustices, while doing one’s utmost to refrain from aggressive discussions or attacking others. Interestingly, this has in particular been voiced by Muslim men interviewees, probably because they encounter the stereotype of being aggressive more in everyday life. Karim (47y) stresses the following:

The way I interact with people is very important to me. If I talk to my neighbor, if I am out on the streets, in my conversations or in my interactions with people I aim to show what a Muslim truly is, because I know they predominantly see me as Muslim. I am not going to be the one who is going to steal, fight or something like that. To me that’s not what Muslims do. It’s about living together, as the Prophet informed us. That’s what we try to do, and while adjusting to the situations that can occur. That’s the way I see myself as Muslim, to do what as much as possible as Muslim. You could say that I am deeply religious. So, it comes down to the following: if Flemish people see you, at the end they should have a positive image of Muslims.

This notion of being Good Muslims, or good citizens inspired by Islam, in everyday life is viewed by participants as crucial to tackle dominant narratives about Muslims and to achieve recognition for who Muslims truly are. These daily acts and gestures of Islamic practices that are not quite political enough to be perceived as such, or infrapolitics (Scott Citation1990, 183), can slowly break down the negative portrayals surrounding Muslims. Moreover, since participants are aware they are perceived as representatives of Islam, and thus performing da’wa (Fadil Citation2006; Jouili Citation2007) this will affect how they view their engagement. As men aim to be not perceived as aggressor or criminal, Wissam (38), a Muslim women, explains how being good and an engaged neighbour is important:

We have to do what the prophet Muhammed summoned us to do. Be good. Not only towards Muslims, but also your whole attitude. There is a hadith, that I can’t recall literally. But it’s your attitude, akhlaq, that you have to show to everyone. It’s about how to represent Muslims. A lot of people don’t know anything about Islam, who never interacted with Muslims. Through your behavior, people can get a whole other portrayal of Islam. That’s important. Do something about your behavior. For instance, we have the same neighbors for over 30 years. With Easter, they send us Easter eggs, and with Islamic feasts, we send them cookies. [. . .] Let them see another image than what they see on TV.

In the last sentence, Wissam summarized what Muslims ought to do: to show an image which differs from the dominant stereotypes on TV, through their everyday religious conduct understood as da’wa. Wissam mainly refers to the stereotype of the oppressed Muslim women as she has explained before. Thus to represent Islam in a good manner, to mitigate exclusion and be perceived as equal citizen, one must counter these narratives. Being a Good Muslim goes back to Prophet Mohamed showing patience and meeting hate with love, thus imitating the Prophet’s behaviour during his hardships while remaining engaged in society. In addition, since her religious beliefs are visible – Wissam wears a headscarf – she feels the burden to give the best possible impression of Muslims. When referring to giving cookies to the neighbours at Islamic feasts as a political gesture, Wissam aims to convey an image of generous and caring Muslims who belong in society.

Paradoxically, despite the importance of Islam for the participants, converted Muslim participants stated that they are reluctant to self-present themselves as Muslims to the majority in everyday interactions such as work or on social media to avoid exclusion. This is illustrated by Linda (31y) a nurse working in a retirement home who converted to Islam a few years ago. She shared how her close environment reacted badly when she converted as if she was disloyal. These experiences made her hesitant to share her conversion with others, for instance at work. She declares:

I am not going to tell [that I am Muslim], because I am scared of hitting the wall and they [my colleagues] will look at me in a different way […] It sometimes bothers me. Maybe I will grow out of it. But for now, I can’t handle the confrontation.

This fear of being judged and excluded also shapes Muslim participants’ (in particular women’s) religious practices such as wearing the veil, as they are constantly considering the consequences. Previous research has described the formation of Muslim subjectivities as a process of negotiation about interpretations of Islamic performances, practices and experiences (de Koning Citation2008), questioning how to manage their conduct in everyday encounters with non-Muslims (Tibi Citation2010; Van Es Citation2019). Mahmut (Citation2021) has also pointed out how Muslims in Quebec hide their Muslimness as a strategy in order to avoid Islamophobia. Some research participants, such as Louiza (34y), a housewife and mother of two, therefore monitor not only their behaviour but also their (religious) appearances fearing rejection. She explains how she previously was aware of her gendered and minoritized status, and tried to fully assimilate in her language and appearances i.e. by dying her hair blond.

If I identify myself as a Muslim, and yes, my name says something, but it’s really the way you look that is important. I struggled as I feared racism. I feared rejections, comments, awkward behavior towards me. Eventually, I took the step [wearing a veil], but very late like in my thirties. But still feeling a bit uncomfortable about it. People act differently although I am still me, I talk and act the same but from the moment I put on my hijab, there is a clear reticence.

Building up a counterpower

Research participants acknowledge that a substantive transformation needs a long process and a more collective struggle. In light of this, the analysis revealed a collective strategy of supporting and strengthening others, mostly younger generations, helping them to engage more strongly with society. Through organizing themselves, they also sought to address important issues such as anti-racism, education and the labour market to abolish obstacles for younger generations. Research participants with children talked about how young people should invest in their education, through the hardships of living in a racialized society. Yasmina (41y), a housewife and mother of six children, emphasized that her children should prepare for ‘the real world’, arguing that:

Life is not all about sunshine and rainbows … As a Belgian with a Moroccan background you have to prove yourself double as hard, you have to put up with a lot of things to achieve something in life. That’s general knowledge. You also have to be careful what you say and do, because you know how it will be interpreted [by the majority]. They [my children] have to prepare themselves for the prejudices people have about them. When you stand up for your faith, you will be reprimanded.

While some emphasized the need to endure hardships, this message stood in stark contrast with other interviewees such as Karim (47y), a city official with a large network, who talked about the importance of pushing youngsters to act. Interviewees with a job, large network and engagement in civil society organization were more eager to train youngsters to counter societal marginalization. For instance, through Karim’s job and civic engagement, which involved bringing together the mayor, the police and young Muslims for a meeting, he encouraged youngsters to speak about their interests, concerns and needs. By informing and discussing matters with political decision makers, Muslims citizens should force them to listen to their grievances and hold them accountable. Although Karim understands the frustrations of young people, throwing in the towel is not an option. He perceives young Muslims as the future to tackle domination, and therefore must get them ready to participate. In the words of Karim:

… we have to get young Muslims ready for the future. Because most of them are not into it. They are all negative about the future. But to me, it’s the contrary: when you understand everything and can position yourself in the debate, make yourself heard and a bit articulated, you can counter oppression. Don’t let yourself be treated badly as we [older generations] did. That’s the reason why I participate, to push youngsters. [to participate]

He thus urges youngsters to refrain of doing the same als the older generations, notably to be treated bad, but learn from their mistakes. Karim also criticized how most young Muslims currently react to being excluded: by participating in riots, vandalism or hanging around in public spaces, which could also be perceived as everyday hidden resistance tactics (Scott Citation1985). By engaging with young people, he tries to show how they can participate in a lawful and meaningful way. Other participants complained that the Muslim community is divided by religious interpretations, gender and class; these divisions prevent the formation of a strong and powerful community that can work together to abolish oppression. All in all, the participants were – in their own words – realistic, as they did not believe that change would occur overnight. Indeed, to achieve revolutionary changes, huge struggles are needed opposing the core of the oppression as interlocutors aim to shatter the constructed superiority position of the West. These strategies of coming together, aiming to achieve revolutionary changes, are described as weapons of the weak thus emphasizing everyday forms of ‘genuine’ resistance of subjectivities (Scott Citation1985). However, the paradox remains: people are attempting to belong to a community that renders them powerless through distorted projections of Muslims. However, as Du Bois, (Citation[1999] 1903) would argue: without striving, the racialized will stay imprisoned.

Conclusion

This article contributes to the scholarly understanding of everyday (hidden) resistance acts enacted by Muslim participants to resist domination in a racialized environment, notably Flanders (Belgium). The analysis showed that research participants see themselves through the eyes of the dominant group, which influences their self-formation and political behaviour. Moreover, the intersection of religion, ethnicity, and gender shapes how participants experience racialization in myriad ways, but also how they understand, negotiate and challenge oppressive discourses in their everyday life through hidden tactics.

In this study three everyday hidden resistance practices were discussed: a) reversing the Gaze by gaining knowledge about those in power and their strategies b) being a good Muslim, living by the example of the Prophet Mohamed, thus being a good citizen and 3) aiming to build a counterpower involving younger generations to oppose the hegemonic anti-Islamic discourse. These practices show that research participants are never merely passive objects: they are able to influence power structures, although never enough to dismantle or abolish domination completely. In short, this study shows the need to focus not only on recognized forms of political participation, but also on everyday (hidden) resistance acts when studying the minoritized.

This study encountered limitations with regard to the limited sample size, thus the findings may not be generalizable but should be rather perceived as an exploration of contemporary everyday resistance acts of Muslims in Belgium. Second, as most research participants had a Moroccan migration background and enjoyed a higher educated, a proper in-depth intersectional analysis was challenging. A more diversified sample (i.e. education, ethnicity) and in-depth analysis focusing on how intersections of religion, race, ethnicity, education and gender shape Muslims’ resistance strategies would be a fruitful future endeavour. Lastly, further research should investigate hidden and creative forms of resistance to explore the myriad ways in which the less powerful minorities navigate a racialized society, in particular in societies with growing public debates about Islam and rising popularity of radical right parties in Flanders (Belgium).

Acknowledgement

The author gratefully acknowledges the support and valuable feedback provided by Nadia Fadil on previous versions of the manuscript. I thank the reviewers for their constructive and helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. There are no official statistiscs available regarding the percentage of Muslims in Belgium. I therefore rely on the Pew Research Center data

2. Permission was granted by the Ethical Commission of the university to which the author is affiliated.

3. This study aims to gain insights in Muslims’resistance strategies, without these findings being generalizable to the whole Belgian Muslim community.

4. When both or one of the parents/grandparents were born in a non-EU country, the participants are coded as respectively second and third generation.

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Overview of research participants

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SOURCE https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1070289X.2024.2347782#abstract

Categories: Belgium, European Union, Muslims

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