From Versailles to Switzerland: Can diplomacy fix what Epic Fury couldn’t?

icon

Author

Faisal J. Abbas

June 18, 2026

President Donald Trump signs the memorandum of understanding to bring an end to the US-Iran war. (Screenshot)
President Donald Trump signs the memorandum of understanding to bring an end to the US-Iran war. (Screenshot)

The historic halls of the Palace of Versailles have, throughout modern history, played host to the drafting of documents that have redrawn the geopolitical map of the world. The memorandum of understanding signed there by US President Donald Trump on Wednesday is no exception. Yet, as the ink dries on this latest framework, the global commentary machine has split into two fiercely polarized camps.

On social media and across international news networks, the divide is stark. The optimists, heavily populated by pro-Trump pundits and administration officials, are full of praise. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth boldly proclaimed that this new deal was “born out of strength,” asserting it is far superior to any previous accord. On the flip side, the pessimists are already labeling it a disaster, arguing it falls short of what the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action achieved.

Even former President Barack Obama, who was the force behind the JCPOA, weighed in, expressing deep skepticism that any new agreement could be a significant improvement on the original framework. In a moment of retrospective candor, Obama noted that the lesson learned from recent events is that, while “bombing our way to solutions” might seem appealing, exploring diplomacy from the outset remains the wiser option.

Others raise an uncomfortable question now echoing through the diplomatic corridors of the Gulf: Had Oman been permitted to conclude its backchannel negotiations before the devastating 40 days of Operation Epic Fury commenced, would the outcome have been more positive for everyone? The US might have extracted greater concessions without firing a shot; the Strait of Hormuz would have remained open; the collateral economic and infrastructure damage to the Gulf economies would have been averted; and Iran would have spared itself catastrophic domestic costs and civilian casualties, allowing it to build on the regional goodwill generated by the Beijing Declaration as a working model.

But I am a realist. I am neither here to sing the praises of the US and Israel, nor will I join those engaged in crying over spilt milk.

As a realist, our first order of business must be to commend the monumental diplomatic efforts of Pakistan and Qatar. Getting the warring parties to agree a deal was an extraordinary feat of mediation. While both Islamabad and Doha undoubtedly wished for better, tighter terms, this memorandum of understanding represents the absolute best possible outcome given the volatile mix of actors involved.

That being said, the situation remains far from ideal. There is huge ambiguity over Iran’s nuclear capabilities. What does not help this time around is that the Trump administration had already announced it had obliterated the nuclear program last year during the 12-day war. But then it started this war in February, stating it is hitting more nuclear targets. So, what then, were the achievements of last year’s Operation Midnight Hammer if the nuclear program survived? And how do we ensure that the nuclear program has actually been obliterated this time? Iran would have to agree to inspections, and unconditional ones, and the question remains if they will do so by the end of the negotiations.

Then there is the fact that the text of the memorandum of understanding leaves several glaring, problematic questions unanswered — chief among them the future of the Strait of Hormuz. We cannot afford to sugarcoat the recent statements made by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf, who bluntly stated that the Strait of Hormuz would “never return to the way it was before the war.”

If this issue is ignored or kicked down the road, it is a guaranteed recipe for the next crisis. Left untreated by decisive negotiations, it essentially gives the Iranian regime a free hand to blacken the skies of global commerce and blackmail the region whenever its future demands are not met or whenever it has a bilateral grievance with its neighboring Gulf states.

While some countries have developed, or are developing, alternative pipeline routes to bypass the Strait of Hormuz for crude oil exports — such as Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline to the Red Sea and the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah line — these measures offer only partial relief and cannot mitigate the broader crisis that would arise from any sustained disruption in the waterway. The Strait of Hormuz is far more than an oil and gas chokepoint; it serves as a critical artery for global maritime trade, carrying not just energy but a vast array of essential shipments including liquefied natural gas, petrochemical feedstocks, industrial chemicals and fertilizers.

Notably, about one-third of global seaborne fertilizer trade and nearly half of certain nitrogen fertilizer exports (like urea) transit through this narrow passage from major Gulf producers. In an interesting and reassuring development, at a press conference on Thursday, US Vice President J.D. Vance said that if the Strait of Hormuz was not unconditionally opened by the end of the negotiations, there would be no deal.

The negotiations are not ending; they are just beginning. The coming weeks in Switzerland will either defuse a ticking time bomb or leave us sitting on one.

Faisal J. Abbas | Editor-in-Chief

Another equally concerning aspect of the memorandum of understanding is the total absence of any mention of Iran’s ballistic missile program. One of the primary stated goals of Operation Epic Fury was to decisively degrade Iran’s military capabilities. It takes a remarkable degree of cognitive dissonance to omit them from this agreement, especially after the world witnessed how Tehran deployed them during the conflict.

Trump recently sought to downplay this, claiming that 84 percent to 85 percent of Iran’s ballistic missiles were destroyed during the campaign. Predictably, Tehran’s state-controlled media and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have aggressively pushed a counternarrative, insisting their strategic deterrent remains fully functional. So, again, there is no proof that the percentages quoted by the US President are confirmed.

Then comes the highly publicized chatter regarding a rumored $300 billion reconstruction fund. On this matter, I defer entirely to the comments of Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan. Speaking on the sidelines of a diplomatic summit in Vienna this week, Prince Faisal noted that he had no information regarding such a fund. Instead, he rightly emphasized that the immediate priority must be the painstakingly slow process of rebuilding trust. As the foreign minister pointed out, the Iranian strikes against the Gulf during the war severely undermined the regional trust that was just beginning to take root post-Beijing.

We must achieve through peaceful means what war failed to permanently secure. And make no mistake: despite the regime’s bravado, Iran is hurting deeply. Independent economic assessments reveal that Iran suffered about $144 billion in economic damage — a staggering 40 percent of its pre-war gross domestic product. For a country already reeling from years of protests over deteriorating living standards, this is an unsustainable burden.

Tehran is not a monolith; it does possess rational actors who understand that Iran’s economic survival hinges on normalized relations with its neighbors. On that note, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has been keen to stress ⁠the importance of dialogue with Gulf Arab states to address misunderstandings and ⁠strengthen regional ties — but the question remains, do his words echo the mood in Tehran or are such statements made for foreign consumption?

Will the Gulf states invest in Iran to help it recover? Prior to the war, when the Beijing Declaration was bearing fruit, such discussions were on the table. But returning to that point will require time, verifiable behavioral changes and ironclad reassurances.

As we consider the critical 60-day window of negotiations in Switzerland, there are zero guarantees of Iranian compliance. What is certain, however, is that Riyadh and its Gulf Cooperation Council partners will be engaging in intense regional consultations. Prince Faisal’s briefings in Vienna made it clear that Saudi Arabia will be heavily involved in shaping the upcoming permanent framework. This is vital. The most glaring flaw of the 2015 JCPOA was the fatal mistake of excluding regional states and ignoring Iran’s regional behavior, its proxy militias and its conventional threats. We cannot allow history to repeat itself.

If negotiations fail, we will be forced to rely on the dual-track strategy that Saudi Arabia has masterfully executed throughout this crisis: diplomacy backed by credible deterrence.

Saudi diplomacy during this war was nothing short of exemplary. By maintaining open lines of communication, keeping the Iranian ambassador in Riyadh and ensuring continuous contact between foreign ministers, Saudi Arabia prevented a geopolitical explosion from devolving into, or being perceived as, a catastrophic Sunni-Shiite sectarian war. At the same time, the Kingdom’s robust defensive response proved that Riyadh’s multibillion-dollar investments in its state-of-the-art defense capabilities were never the “vanity purchases” cynical Western analysts claimed they were. Without that military readiness, the map of the Middle East would look terrifyingly different today.

As Washington remains hyperfocused on the nuclear file, the Gulf states must take the lead in ensuring that regional security, militia containment and sanctions relief are leveraged correctly.

And for both optimists and pessimists, we should all remember that the negotiations are not ending; they are only just beginning. The coming weeks in Switzerland will either defuse a ticking time bomb or leave us sitting on one. To prevent the latter, a unified, unyielding regional position and high-level engagement is more critical than ever before.

  • Faisal J. Abbas is the Editor-in-Chief of Arab News. X: @FaisalJAbbas

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News’ point of view

source https://www.arabnews.com/node/2647735

Leave a Reply