Guidance

Updated 5 February 2026

Contents

1. Executive summary
2. Assessment
3. Country information
4. Annex A: note to CPIT from the IHRC, July 2021
5. Annex B: meeting with IHRC and an Ahmadi community leader, August 2024
6. Annex C: IHRC update on Ahmadi women, September 2024
7. Annex D: email to CPIT from British High Commission (BHC), April 2021
8. Annex E
9. Research methodology
10. Terms of reference
11. Bibliography
12. Version control and feedback

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Version 6.0, March 2025

Executive summary

In 1974, the Pakistani government officially declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims. This status remains and is reinforced through various laws and anti-Ahmadi rhetoric. Provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code restrict the ways in which Ahmadis can openly express and practise their beliefs.

Whilst official figures record the Ahmadi population at 162,684, the true population is considered higher, estimated at between 400,000 and 600,000.

Anti-Ahmadi rhetoric by public officials, attacks on Ahmadi places of worship, graves and gravestones occur, including demolition of minarets, graffiti, and arson – at times with police complicity. Ahmadis are at risk of prosecution under blasphemy laws and specific anti-Ahmadi laws.

Ahmadis who openly practise their faith (beyond the restricted basis permitted by domestic law) are likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state.

Widespread societal harassment and discrimination against community members occurs, including hate speech, physical attacks including murder, and destruction of property.

Societal treatment and attitudes towards Ahmadis, particularly those who openly practise their faith, may, depending on the nature and repetition of such treatment, reach the threshold of persecution or serious harm.

Effective protection is limited due to restrictive legislation against Ahmadis who are reluctant to report incidents due to potential blasphemy charges. Whilst AW (sufficiency of protection) Pakistan [2011] UKUT 31(IAC) concluded that it ‘cannot be said that such a general insufficiency of state protection has been established [in Pakistan]’, this does not apply to Ahmadis. In general, the state is able but unwilling to provide effective protection.

In the light of the nationwide effect in Pakistan of the anti-Ahmadi legislation, internal relocation is unlikely to be reasonable for a person who wishes to openly practise their faith.

Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’.

All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.

Assessment

Section updated: 28 February 2025

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw, and provides an assessment of whether, in general:

• a person faces a real risk of persecution/serious harm by state or non-state actors because they are Ahmadi
• the state (or de facto state) can provide effective protection
• internal relocation is possible to avoid persecution/serious harm
• a claim, if refused, is likely or not to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)).

1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

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1.2 Exclusion

1.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

1.2.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).

1.2.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

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2. Convention reason(s)

2.1.1 Actual or imputed religion.

2.1.2 Establishing a convention reason is not sufficient to be recognised as a refugee. The question is whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of an actual or imputed Refugee Convention reason.

2.1.3 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum Instruction, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

3. Risk

3.1 Risk from the state

3.1.1 Ahmadis who openly practise their faith (beyond the restricted basis permitted by domestic law) are likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state.

3.1.2 In 1974, the Pakistani government officially declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims. This status remains and is reinforced through various laws and anti-Ahmadi rhetoric. Under the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) they are prohibited from citing the Quran, displaying Quranic text, calling their place of worship a mosque, performing the Muslim call to prayer, using traditional Islamic greetings in public, preaching and sharing their faith, or printing or obtaining material related to their faith (see Legal rights and Freedom of speech and media).

3.1.3 Ahmadis must sign a declaration swearing they are non-Muslim to obtain national identification cards (see Official documents). Similarly, Ahmadis can vote only if they declare they are non-Muslim, declare their founder is an imposter, and add their names to a separate voter list. Many choose not to vote rather than deny their beliefs (see Electoral register and voting rights). Ahmadis face significant barriers to political representation, being barred from holding public office and excluded from minority rights protections unless they renounce their faith (see Representation in public office).

3.1.4 Anti-Ahmadi rhetoric by public officials continues to be reported. In September 2024, the Upper House of Parliament passed a resolution to declare 7 September as Finality of Prophethood (Khatm-e-Nabuwat) Day to commemorate the day in 1974 when Ahmadis were declared as non-Muslim (see Anti-Ahmadi rhetoric).

3.1.5 Attacks on Ahmadi places of worship, graves and gravestones occur, including demolition of minarets, graffiti, and arson, at times with police complicity. Between 36 and 44 places of worship, and 109 graves and gravestones were vandalised in 2023. Despite a September 2023 High Court judgement ruling the caretakers of Ahmadi sites of worship could not be held liable for the construction of minarets at sites that predate the 1984 PPC provisions (Ordinance XX, which prevents, amongst other things, Ahmadis from calling themselves Muslims or their places of worship Mosques), such damage to property continued in 2024 (see Destruction of property, Blasphemy and ‘anti-Ahmadi’ laws and Police and judicial protection).

3.1.6 Estimates on the number of Ahmadis in Pakistan are unreliable because many boycott the census as they are not able to self-identify as Muslim. The official 2023 census results put the number at 162,684 (0.07% of the total population); community sources estimated between 400,000-600,000 (see Demography).

3.1.7 In 2023, 329 people were accused of blasphemy, 20% (65) of whom were Ahmadi, and 19 new cases were registered against Ahmadis under anti-Ahmadi and blasphemy laws. Many defendants accused of blasphemy spend years in pre-trial detention and conviction rates in the lower courts are high. Of the 767 people imprisoned for blasphemy since 2020 (as of July 2024), at least 6 were Ahmadi (see Application of the blasphemy laws).

3.1.8 A person who converts to another faith or who is seen to renounce Islam in any other way can be targeted for blasphemy, which carries the death penalty, although it is not enforced. Although religious conversion is not in itself illegal, as of December 2018 the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) refused to change a convert’s religion from Islam to another faith on national identity cards (see Converts).

3.1.9 In the Upper Tribunal (UT) in the country guidance case of MN and others (Ahmadis – country conditions – risk) Pakistan CG [2012] UKUT 389 (IAC) (14 November 2012), heard on 26, 27, 29 March, 28, 31 May and 20 June 2012, held that ‘Ahmadis are an oppressed religious minority in Pakistan. The relevant provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code … restrict the ways in which Ahmadis are able to express and practise their beliefs. If defied, the provisions expose Ahmadis to the risk of prosecution coupled with a risk of detention pending trial’ (paragraph 101).

3.1.10 The UT also held that:

‘The ability of Ahmadis to defend any prosecution that may ensue after faith-based FIRs have been issued under the PPC, is hampered by the risk of unfair treatment by the police and the trial courts. These problems relate not only to the substance of any prosecution but also the ability of Ahmadis to readily obtain bail prior to or after proceedings have been brought… On the other hand Ahmadis can be reasonably confident that on appeal to higher courts unfair or unreasonable decisions are likely to be overturned’ (para 102).

3.1.11 Setting out the country guidance in MN and others the UT held that:

‘The background to the risk faced by Ahmadis is legislation that restricts the way in which they are able openly to practise their faith. The legislation not only prohibits preaching and other forms of proselytising but also in practice restricts other elements of manifesting one’s religious beliefs, such as holding open discourse about religion with non-Ahmadis, although not amounting to proselytising. The prohibitions include openly referring to one’s place of worship as a mosque and to one’s religious leader as an Imam. In addition, Ahmadis are not permitted to refer to the call to prayer as azan nor to call themselves Muslims or refer to their faith as Islam. Sanctions include a fine and imprisonment and if blasphemy is found, there is a risk of the death penalty which to date has not been carried out although there is a risk of lengthy incarceration if the penalty is imposed’ (paragraph 119i).

3.1.12 The UT further held ‘It is, and has long been, possible in general for Ahmadis to practise their faith on a restricted basis either in private or in community with other Ahmadis, without infringing domestic Pakistan law’ (para 119ii).

3.1.13 In MN and others the UT also held that:

‘If an Ahmadi is able to demonstrate that it is of particular importance to his religious identity to practise and manifest his faith openly in Pakistan in defiance of the restrictions in the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) under sections 298B and 298C, by engaging in behaviour described in [paragraph 119i relating to open practise of faith], he or she is likely to be in need of protection, in the light of the serious nature of the sanctions that potentially apply as well as the risk of prosecution under section 295C for blasphemy’ (paragraph 120i).

‘It is no answer to expect an Ahmadi who fits the description just given to avoid engaging in behaviour described in [paragraph 119i] to avoid a risk of prosecution’ (paragraph 120ii).

3.1.14 However, the Court of Appeal (EWCA) in the case of WA (Pakistan) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 302, heard 30 and 31 January 2019 and promulgated on 6 March 2019, examined the  findings in MN and others and held that there is no requirement that open practise of faith should be of ‘particular importance’ (paragraph 60(iii)).

‘If the decision-maker’s conclusion is that the Claimant, if returned to Pakistan, will avoid behaviour which would attract persecution, then the decision-maker must ask the question why that would be so. Many possibilities arise. The individual may genuinely wish to live quietly, and would do so whether or not repression existed in relation to the expression of his or her Ahmadi faith. The individual may have mixed motives for such behaviour. If such a quiet expression or manifestation of genuine Ahmadi belief is merely the result of established cultural norms or social pressures, then it is unlikely there will be a basis for asylum. However, if a material reason (and not necessarily the only reason) for such behaviour will be to avoid persecution, then it is likely that the Claimant will have a valid claim for asylum. There is no requirement that public expression of Ahmadi religious faith, of a kind which is likely to attract persecution, should be of “particular importance” to the Claimant. Such a requirement is inconsistent with the test as laid down in HJ (Iran).

‘To that extent, the guidance given in the body of MN (Ahmadis) Pakistan CG [paragraph 120i] and in the headnote [3i] is misleading and should not be followed’ (paragraphs 60iii and 61).

3.1.15 In MN and others the UT held that ‘Ahmadis who are not able to show that they practised their faith at all in Pakistan or that they did so on anything other than the restricted basis described in [paragraph 119ii] are in general unlikely to be able to show that their genuine intentions or wishes are to practise and manifest their faith openly on return, as described in [paragraph 119i relating to open practise of faith]’ (paragraph 125).

3.1.16 The country information in this note does not indicate that there are ‘very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ to depart from these findings.  MN and others should continue to be followed albeit in line with the EWCA finding that there is no requirement that open practise of faith should be of ‘particular importance.’

3.1.17 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

3.2 Risk from non-state actors

3.2.1 Societal treatment and attitudes towards Ahmadis, particularly those who openly practise their faith, may, depending on the nature and repetition of such treatment, reach the threshold of persecution or serious harm.

3.2.2 Many Ahmadis conceal their faith to avoid societal harassment, threats and physical attacks. However, widespread societal harassment and discrimination against community members continues, regardless of their social status, as do physical attacks. Between 1984 and December 2023 there were 277 murders and 478 assaults, according to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, however it is not clear whether this information relates solely to societal actors. Isolated attacks against Ahmadis or Ahmadi property in Punjab were noted between 2022 and 2024. In 2023, one Ahmadi was killed, and 4 Ahmadis were reportedly murdered for their faith between March and July 2024. Blasphemy-related violence led to 7 extrajudicial killings since 2014 (see Attacks against Ahmadis).

Anti-Ahmadi rhetoric is common in Khatm-e-Nabuwat conferences, particularly in the months of September and October to mark the anniversary when Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims. Religious leaders make inflammatory speeches against Ahmadis, particularly far right Islamist groups including the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). Media outlets, especially Urdu-language press and social media, regularly publish hate speech targeting Ahmadis, contributing to societal harassment. Some shops refuse service to Ahmadis or display exclusionary signs, particularly in Punjab and Sindh. Ahmadi business owners can face harassment including forced closure of their shops (see Hate speech and discrimination, Anti-Ahmadi rhetoric and Access to employment).

3.2.3 Ahmadi women face discrimination due to their religious identity and gender. They often live in conservative households. Many avoid mosques for safety, limiting their religious participation. While education and employment opportunities exist, women report harassment in public spaces leading to social isolation. Marriages outside the Ahmadi community are prohibited, reinforcing their marginalisation (see Women and marriage).

3.2.4 In MN and others the UT found, from the evidence before them, that:

‘[Ahmadis] face hostility from sectors of the majority of society which is made up of Sunni Muslims. Disagreement with and disapproval of the beliefs of Ahmadis has intensified with the increased Islamisation of Pakistan as well as the growth of fundamentalism. In addition to vulnerability to terrorist threats from the Taliban, they face vehement opposition from the Khatme-e-Nabuwat whose tactics not only include taking out FIRs against Ahmadis but also intimidation. Their influence is pervasive in Pakistani institutions’ (paragraph 101).

3.2.5 In MN and others the UT held that ‘There is clear evidence that this legislation [that restricts the way in which Ahmadis are able openly to practise their faith] is used by non-state actors to threaten and harass Ahmadis. This includes the filing of First Information Reports (FIRs) (the first step in any criminal proceedings) which can result in detentions whilst prosecutions are being pursued. Ahmadis are also subject to attacks by non-state actors from sectors of the majority Sunni Muslim population’ (paragraph 119i).

3.2.6 The UT held in MN and others that ‘The need for protection applies equally to men and women. There is no basis for considering that Ahmadi women as a whole are at a particular or additional risk; the decision that they should not attend mosques in Pakistan was made by the Ahmadi Community following attacks on the mosques in Lahore in 2010. There is no evidence that women in particular were the target of those attacks’ (paragraph 121).

3.2.7 The UT further held:

‘Whilst an Ahmadi who has been found to be not reasonably likely to engage or wish to engage in … behaviour [described in paragraph 119i relating to open practise of faith] is, in general, not at real risk on return to Pakistan, judicial fact-finders may in certain cases need to consider whether that person would nevertheless be reasonably likely to be targeted by non-state actors on return for religious persecution by reason of his/her prominent social and/or business profile’ (paragraph 127).

3.2.8 The country information in this note does not indicate that there are ‘very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ to justify a departure from these findings, although information on the profile of Ahmadis targeted for their faith was limited (see Bibliography).

3.2.9 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

4. Protection

4.1.1 In general, a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state is unlikely to be able to obtain effective protection.

4.1.2 In general, a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from a rogue state actor and/or a non-state actor, is unlikely to obtain effective protection from the state. This is because the state is able but not willing to offer it.

4.1.3 Police protection is limited due to restrictive legislation against Ahmadis.  Ahmadis are reluctant to report incidents due to potential blasphemy charges. Police are reported to sometimes be complicit in the destruction of Ahmadi mosques and gravestones. Despite legal protections, including a 2022 Supreme Court ruling allowing religious practise in private, Ahmadis faced ongoing harassment and restricted practise of faith. A 2024 Supreme Court ruling upholding private worship was challenged by the Punjab government and religious leaders, leading to its partial reversal. Advocates noted that Ahmadi faith and expression is increasingly criminalised, undermining constitutional privacy protections (see Legal rights, Application of the blasphemy laws and Police and judicial protection).

4.1.4 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

5. Internal relocation

5.1.1 In general, a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state is unlikely to be able to relocate to escape that risk.

5.1.2 Internal relocation is unlikely to be reasonable for Ahmadis who wish to practise their faith openly (beyond the restricted basis permitted by domestic law) or where the risk stems from non-state actors threatening to bring about legal action, because anti-Ahmadi legislation applies throughout Pakistan.

5.1.3 Where the person wishes to practise their faith in a way that would not attract attention for reasons other than a fear of persecution, they may be able to avoid risk from non-state actors by moving elsewhere in Pakistan. Whilst noting (above) the imprecise numbers of Ahmadis in Pakistan and the reasons for that, there are up to 600,000, with around 60,000 in Rabwah (officially named Chenab Nagar), the Ahmadi centre in Pakistan. Comparing the census figures from 2017 and 2023, the population of Ahmadis has decreased in all provinces of Pakistan, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan (see Demography).

5.1.4 Rabwah, historically a refuge for Ahmadis, is the only area in Pakistan where Ahmadis are not a minority. However, public hostility and violence from extremists persist. Known Ahmadis are vulnerable to mob attacks, and the community faces religious restrictions, including being unable to openly celebrate festivals like Eid (see Ahmadi community and Societal treatment and attitudes).

5.1.5 In MN and others the UT held that ‘The option of internal relocation, previously considered to be available in Rabwah, is not in general reasonably open to a claimant who genuinely wishes to engage in … behaviour [described in paragraph 119i relating to open practise of faith], in the light of the nationwide effect in Pakistan of the anti-Ahmadi legislation’ (paragraph 124).

5.1.6 The country information in this note does not indicate that there are ‘very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ to justify a departure from these findings.

5.1.7 For further guidance on considering internal relocation and factors to be taken into account see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

6. Certification

6.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

6.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

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